The long-run share price performance resulting from mergers & acquisitions in South Africa: a calendar-time approach by Lumala, Arnold
 
 
 
 
 
The long-run share price performance resulting 
from Mergers & Acquisitions in South Africa: 
A Calendar-Time Approach.  
 
Arnold Lumala 
LMLARN001 
 
 
 
SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
 
 
In fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 
Master of Commerce specialising in Investment Management 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
 
10th February 2019 
 
 
Supervisor: Associate Professor Francois Toerien 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 
of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
i 
 
Abstract 
 
With increasing globalisation and the need to expand into new markets quickly and 
efficiently, South African firms are more than ever relying on mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A). It is therefore important to revisit the debate on whether M&A is a beneficial long-
term corporate strategy for shareholders, especially given that little South African 
literature exists on this issue. This study addresses this question by examining both the 
short- and long-run share return performances resulting from 204 mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) over the period 2003-2014, involving companies listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) as acquirers.   
 
The measurement of long-run performance of M&A and other corporate events such as 
share buy backs and seasoned offerings remains contentious primarily due to concerns 
on the appropriate benchmarks for abnormal share return performance as a result of 
these events and the methodology used to measure long-run realized returns from these 
events. With regard to benchmarks, a combination of four return factors deemed 
appropriate for the South African equity market is used to benchmark the abnormal 
returns related to M&A activities. These factors are the JSE’s Financial & Industrials Index 
(JSE index code J213 or colloquially known as the Findi), the JSE’s Resources Index 
(JSE index code J210 or colloquially known as the Resi), and the size and book-to-market 
factors. Two methods have been widely used to determine the long-run share return 
performance from corporate events: The Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) 
approach and the more statistically robust Calendar Time Portfolio (CTP) approach. 
Using these two approaches, this study finds that, in the long term, there are no 
statistically significant abnormal returns associated with merger and acquisition 
transactions for the sample of South African acquirers tested. 
 
The correlation of a number of key transaction attributes with long-run M&A related share 
return performance is also examined in this study. The following characteristics are thus 
tested: the method of payment (cash, equity or cash and equity), the listing status of 
acquisition targets (private, public or subsidiary), the target’s geographical location (cross-
border or non-cross border, i.e. South African), the relatedness of the target’s industry to 
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the acquirer’s (i.e. conglomerate versus horizontal M&A) and the percentage of the target 
acquired (50% or more and less than 50%). The results indicate that cash acquirers 
outperform both equity and cash and equity acquirers, acquirers of subsidiaries 
outperform acquirers of private or public targets, cross-border acquirers outperform non 
cross-border acquirers, conglomerate M&A underperform horizontal or related M&A and 
gaining control, i.e. acquiring 50% or more of the target results in slightly higher return 
than not gaining control.    
 
In addition, the short-run share return performance of M&A is examined to investigate 
whether investors’ short-run expectations from M&A announcements manifest in the long-
run. The findings indicate that a positive abnormal short-run return is on average achieved 
in the -5, 5 event window. However, the market corrects for this initial positive reaction to 
M&A announcements, as the positive return becomes insignificant within 10 days of the 
announcement. 
 
The results of this study indicate that South African companies’ merger and acquisition 
activities do not deliver any statistically significant short- or long-term value to 
shareholders, implying that great care should be taken when considering such actions.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. Background 
During the course of 2017, global mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity exceeded 
$3 trillion for the fourth consecutive year (Massoudi, Fontanella-Khan and Weinland, 
2017). While the South African M&A market has not recovered to its heights prior to the 
2008 financial crisis, the country’s M&A market has experienced upward momentum 
since 2008, with a record-breaking R1.5 trillion in total value in 2016, largely due to the 
R1.24 trillion AB InBev/SAB merger. As a result, M&A related issues continue to draw 
considerable interest from academics, both internationally and locally.  
 
A much-debated question relating to M&A is whether it delivers positive returns to the 
shareholders of acquirers. For many years, short-term event studies dominated the 
academic literature concerning returns to these shareholders. The conventional belief 
was that the short-term stock price reaction around M&A announcement dates fully 
incorporates the information effects of M&A. However, recent event studies measuring 
long-term1 returns to shareholders of acquirers over the three to five years following the 
completion of M&A have cast doubt on the interpretation of findings from short-term event 
studies. These studies suggest that in the short-term, investors fail to accurately assess 
the full impact of M&A announcements. Although long-term studies vary greatly in design, 
datasets and timeframes, the overall picture indicates long-term post-merger 
underperformance of acquirers and negative return to their shareholders (Mager & Meyer-
Fackler, 2017). 
 
The practical motivation for this study is revealed through the paradox posed by 
Brouthers, Van Hastenburg and Van Den Ven (1998): If the empirical evidence suggests 
that M&A fail in the long-run, why do they remain a popular expansion strategy for 
companies? One of the main reasons brought forward to explain this paradox, which is 
also the focus of this study, is that of statistical malfeasance, particularly the methods 
 
1 Long-term refers to several months or years after the effective date of the event. This study 
conceptualizes long-term as 1-3 years.  
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used to measure post M&A performance. In contrast to event studies over short horizons, 
long-term event studies are sensitive to the methods used for computing returns, as some 
commonly used methods are severely flawed (Mitchell & Stafford, 2000; Fama, 1998). 
Two broad measures have been used to evaluate post- M&A corporate performance: 
accounting measures based on financial ratios and share price returns that are related to 
the capital market (Ramakrishnan, 2008).  
 
With regard to share price returns, two methods have been widely used in literature to 
measure the long-term post-event performance: The Buy-And-Hold Abnormal Return 
(BHAR) and the Calendar-Time Portfolio (CTP) approach, also known as the Jensen-
alpha approach (Khotari & Warner, 2005). This study briefly examines the short-run share 
return performance of acquirers, before turning its attention to the long-run post-
acquisition share return performance of listed South African acquirers. For the long-run 
performance, this study employs both the BHAR and CTP approaches to ensure that 
results relating to long-term abnormal returns are consistent and robust across different 
methodological choices.  
1.2. Research problem 
Despite most empirical evidence pointing towards underperformance of acquirers 
following M&As, studies on the long-term post-merger performance of acquiring firms, in 
both developed and developing countries, have failed to come to a convincing and 
definitive conclusion on overall long-term acquirer performance and whether M&A create 
or destroy shareholder value. In South Africa, the bulk of the empirical research suggests 
that M&A do not create any meaningful value for shareholders of acquirers (Wimberley & 
Negash, 2004). In spite of this evidence, M&A remain a popular corporate strategy for 
South African firms.  
 
The popularity and resilience of M&A, despite of their failure to create value for 
shareholders, should not be surprising. Some of the reasons firms engage in M&A, 
particularly the rapidly changing market conditions, increased globalisation and the need 
to expand into new markets quickly and efficiently can only be expected to intensify. M&A 
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can therefore be expected to increase as firms try to cope with an increasingly challenging 
business climate. Given this anticipated increase in M&A, it is important to understand 
whether M&A are creating or destroying shareholders’ value, because only value-creation 
can justify the continued use of M&A as a corporate strategy by South African firms. 
Therefore, the research question is, “Do M&A active companies outperform their non-
active counterparts in the South African context?” 
1.3. Contributions to literature 
This study contributes to the literature in two main ways. Firstly, in addition to informing 
the debate on both short and long-term performance of M&A as measured in terms of 
share returns, this study pays considerable attention to the choice of methodology, 
particularly for the long-term perspective. Two methods have been widely used in 
literature to measure the long-term post-event performance of M&A, namely the BHAR 
and the CTP (Khotari & Warner, 2005). While Barber and Lyon (1997) advocate for the 
BHAR approach, other researchers such as Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000) recommend the CTP approach, primarily because unlike the BHAR approach, it 
corrects for positive cross-correlation in returns of acquiring firms. As previously stated, 
this study uses both the BHAR and CTP approaches to ensure that its findings on long-
term abnormal returns are robust across different methodological choices. However, the 
study puts more weight on the findings of the more statistically sound CTP approach.  
Furthermore, this study is the first to examine long-term post-merger performance in 
emerging markets, particularly South Africa, using the CTP approach.  
 
Secondly, in addition to examining the long-run performance of acquirers, this study also 
examines potential M&A transaction-related characteristics that could be correlated with 
long-term share return performance, to get a better understanding of the possible sources 
of value-creation or destruction arising from South African M&A. Examining these 
determinants will enhance the plausibility and understanding of the long-run post-merger 
performance of South African acquirers. This study is the first to comprehensively 
examine the possible determinants of value-creation or destruction from South African 
M&A.  
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1.4. Research questions 
The research questions examined in this study fit into three broad categories. Firstly, how 
do South African acquirers perform in the short-run, as measured by their total share 
excess returns? This question is only briefly examined in this paper as a baseline in order 
to establish the market’s immediate reactions to merger announcements, but as this topic 
has been examined before in the South African context2, it is not the core focus of this 
study. However, South African M&A performance from a long-term perspective remains 
largely unexplored. Consequentially, the main focus of this paper is the long-term total 
share return to acquirers. Therefore, the second research question is: how do South 
African acquirers’ share prices perform in the long-run? While short-term studies measure 
investors’ expectations, long-run studies examine the impact M&A have on the long-term 
performance of acquirers. Only positive excess performance by acquirers (i.e. share 
return performance higher than would have been expected to be the case without 
acquisitions) can justify the continued use of M&A as a corporate strategy. By examining 
both short and long-term returns, the study implicitly investigates whether investors’ short-
run assessments of M&A manifest in the long-run. The third research question that is 
investigated in this study is whether there are any transaction specific attributes that are 
correlated with the long-term excess returns (if any) of the acquiring companies – in other 
words, are there any transaction-specific elements that possibly have predictive value in 
explaining the long-run performance of acquirers? These three categories will be used as 
sub-sections for the literature review and methodology and results sections.  
1.5. Thesis structure 
The remainder of this document is document is structured as follows. Chapter 2 examines 
the theoretical basis and literature of this study. This chapter focuses mainly on M&A 
theory and event studies, which are the core methodology used in this study. Chapter 3 
discusses the relevant empirical literature and its findings, and is followed by Chapter 4, 
which describes the sample selection and data used in this study. Chapter 5 describes 
and analyses the methodology used and the findings of the study, and Chapter 6 
concludes.   
 
2 See Mushidzhi and Ward (2004), Smit and Ward (2007) and Ndlovu (2017).  
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Chapter 2: Theoretical framework 
M&A refer to corporate actions that involve purchasing and or joining with other 
companies (Ramakrishnan, 2008). A merger refers to the consolidation of two or more 
companies into one, while an acquisition refers to the takeover of one entity by another 
(Ramakrishnan, 2008). There are four types of M&A: horizontal M&A (M&A within the 
same industry); vertical M&A (M&A within the same industry but at different points in the 
supply chain); congeneric M&A (M&A between companies in related industries with 
different products) and conglomerate M&A (M&A between companies in unrelated 
industries with very little in common) (Dalkılıç & Cagle, 2015).  
 
The theoretical reasons that drive M&A can be divided into three broad categories: 
economic, strategic and personal reasons. Economic motives have the explicit goal of 
creating value for shareholders by releasing synergies from increasing revenue and 
profits, cutting costs and economies of scale. Strategic motives, on the other hand, aim 
to achieve long-term growth by improving the strategic positioning of the firm through 
global expansion, pursuing market power, acquisition of new resources (including 
managerial skills and raw materials) and improving the competitive environment by 
acquiring a competitor or creating barriers to entry and product line extensions (Brouthers, 
van Hastenburg & van den Ven, 1998). Personal motives include enhancement of 
managerial prestige through increased sales and firm growth and increased remuneration 
through increased sales or profitability (Brouthers, van Hastenburg & van den Ven, 1998). 
 
Regardless of the motive, M&A are expected to impact the acquirer’s performance in 
terms of profitability, shareholder wealth, research and development, resource 
redeployment, management effectiveness, and a variety of other value creation indicators 
(Dobreva & Kwenda, 2017). The impact of M&A on shareholder wealth has been the most 
empirically examined indicator of value creation through two primary means: accounting 
measures based on objective data, such as cash flow returns and other financial ratios, 
and share price returns, again based on objective data that are related to the capital 
market (Ramakrishnan, 2008). In this study, the focus is on share price returns examined 
primarily from a long-term perspective, and briefly from a short-term perspective. 
6 
 
2.1 Event studies 
This section begins by discussing the measurement of long-term performance. At the 
core of this discussion are the methodologies used for measurement of returns and the 
benchmarks for expected return used in long-term event studies. The use of different 
methodologies and benchmarks for expected returns could potentially explain the 
inconsistent findings of the long-run performance from M&A found in the literature. Event 
studies examine the impact of corporate events such as M&A, share buy backs and stock 
splits on share prices of participating firms. For each sample security i, the return on the 
security for time period t relative to the event, Rit, is: 
 
Rit = Kit + eit        (1) 
 
Where: Kit is the normal or expected return in the absence of the event and eit is the 
excess or abnormal return as a result of the event and indicates the change in shareholder 
wealth as a result of the event.  
 
Abnormal returns are a crucial measure of long-term performance of corporate events 
such as M&A, seasoned equity offerings, IPOs and share repurchases. The abnormal 
return of a firm that underwent an event can be defined as the difference between realized 
return and the expected or normal return in the absence of the event.  
 
With regard to measurement of post-event realised returns in long-term studies, two 
approaches have been widely used in literature: the event-time method using the Buy-
and-Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) and the Calendar-Time Portfolio (CTP) approach, 
also known as the Jensen-alpha approach (Khotari & Warner, 2005). While two main 
methods have been utilized to measure realized returns, normal returns are estimated in 
a variety of ways such as the return on a market index i.e. a market return model, using 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) or a multi-factor model such as the three-factor 
model developed by Fama and French (1993) and the Carhart four-factor model 
developed by Carhart (1997). The study discusses the measurement of post-event 
realised returns first and then turns its attention to normal return models. 
7 
 
2.1.1 Measurement of realized returns 
Beginning with Fama et al. (1969), the convention in literature was to estimate long-term 
abnormal results by summing daily or monthly average abnormal returns over time i.e. 
the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) approach. However, Barber and Lyon 
(1997) argue that Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) have two biases: the 
new listing bias and measurement bias.  
 
The measurement bias arises because the CAAR approach ignores compounding of 
returns (Barber & Lyon, 1997). Since the CAAR approach ignores the compounding effect 
in returns, it does not accurately measure the return to an investor who holds a security 
for a long period after the event (Fama, 1998). Regarding the new listing bias, long-term 
event studies require researchers to identify an initial event month for each event firm in 
their sample. However, because many new firms begin trading after this initial month and 
form part of the market index against which sample firms’ performance is benchmarked, 
Barber and Lyon (1997) anticipate that over long-term periods, the population mean for 
CAARs would be positively biased. Barber and Lyon (1997) refer to this as the new listing 
bias and because of these two biases, they advocate for the BHAR approach. 
 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) describe BHAR as “the average multi-year return from a 
strategy of investing in all firms that complete an event and selling at the end of a pre-
specified holding period versus a comparable strategy using otherwise similar non-event 
firms.” Put simply, the BHAR approach estimates abnormal return as the difference 
between the long-run compounded buy-and-hold return of a sample firm less the long-
run compounded return of an appropriate benchmark. Barber and Lyon (1997) suggest 
three return benchmarks for expected return: a reference portfolio such as the market 
index, a control firm benchmark, where sample firms are matched to a similar firm on the 
basis of specified firm characteristics such as size and book-to-market, and an asset 
pricing benchmark such as the Fama and French three-factor model. 
 
Whilst the BHAR approach is a significant improvement over the CAAR approach since 
it considers the effect of compounding on event study returns and therefore precisely 
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measures investor experience, it is not without criticism. Mitchell and Stafford (2000) 
criticize the BHAR approach for three main reasons. Firstly, the buy-and-hold experience 
is only one investor experience and there are other investing strategies that capture 
investors’ experiences, such as periodic portfolio rebalancing (Mitchell & Stafford, 2000). 
Secondly, as a consequence of the compounding effect, BHARs increase with an 
increase in the holding period. For instance, if abnormal performance exists for only the 
first six months following an event and three and five-year BHARs are calculated, both 
can be significant, due to the compounding of the six-month abnormal return. 
Furthermore, due to compounding, the five-year BHAR will be larger in magnitude than 
the three-year BHAR. Thirdly, and most importantly, the BHAR is hampered by serious 
statistical problems that cannot be easily corrected (Mitchell & Stafford, 2000). 
 
The statistical shortcomings of the BHAR approach have been summarized by Khotari 
and Warner (2005). Firstly, the volatility of the event firm returns exceeds that of matched 
firms because of event-induced volatility. Secondly, long-run BHARs depart from the 
normality assumption that underlies many statistical tests, primarily due to a skewness. 
As an example, Fama (1998) finds that returns from an asset pricing benchmark, tend to 
be right skewed. Barber and Lyon (1997) shed more light on the skewness bias by 
suggesting that while it is common to observe a sample firm with an annual return in 
excess of 100%, it is uncommon to observe a return on the market index in excess of 
100%. Since abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between the sample firm 
return and the market return, abnormal returns are positively skewed.   
 
Thirdly, long-run returns are cross-correlated because many event firms are drawn from 
a few industries and corporate events such as M&A typically occur in waves. Mitchell & 
Stafford (2000) suggest that the cross-correlation in returns arising from overlapping 
cases of event firms results in skewed returns. Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) use 
Microsoft’s common stock split in April 1990, June 1991, and June 1992 as an example 
of overlapping cases. Clearly, the three- or five-year returns calculated relative to each of 
these event months are not independent because these returns share several months of 
overlapping returns (Lyon, Barber & Tsai, 1999). Due to this cross-correlation, BHAR 
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returns are not independent and the Central Limit Theorem (CLM) which states that a 
large number of independent random variables have a normal distribution does not hold 
(Mitchell & Stafford, 2000). Both Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) suggest 
that if the test statistic in an event study is calculated ignoring cross-dependence in data, 
it is likely be overstated. 
 
Although Barber and Lyon (1997) support the use of the BHAR approach, the authors 
found that using a reference portfolio such as the market index as a benchmark yields 
three biases: the new listing bias, the rebalancing bias and the skewness bias. The new 
listing bias arises as a mismatch between sample firms that have long post-merger 
returns and newly listed firms in the reference portfolio that began trading subsequent to 
the event month, the rebalancing bias arises since the compounded returns of a reference 
portfolio are typically calculated assuming periodic rebalancing while the returns of 
sample firms are compounded without rebalancing and the skewness bias arises because 
long-run abnormal returns are skewed to the right (Barber & Lyon, 1997). 
  
To mitigate biases from the reference portfolio approach, Barber and Lyon (1997) suggest 
the use of the control firm approach, which matches sample firms to control firms of similar 
size and book-to-market value. The control firm approach yielded well-specified test 
statistics as they eliminated the biases from the reference portfolio approach. This 
approach eliminates new listing bias (since both the sample and control firms must be 
listed in the event month), the rebalancing bias (since both the sample and control firms’ 
returns are calculated without rebalancing) and the skewness bias (since both the sample 
and control firms are equally likely to have large positive returns) (Barber & Lyon, 1997). 
However, Khotari and Warner (2005) argue that long-horizon buy-and-hold returns tend 
to be right skewed even after adjusting for the performance of a matched control firm 
since the lower bound for returns is -100% yet returns are unbounded on the upside.  
 
In attempt to redeem the BHAR approach, Khotari and Warner (2005) suggest that the 
skewness bias reduces with sample size and since long-term event studies typically use 
large samples, the extent of the skewness bias is mitigated by the larger sample sizes 
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used in long-run studies. This implies that returns from the BHAR approach are 
independent and can be used for econometric inference. However, the lack of 
independence arising from cross-correlation that results in skewed returns remains a 
challenge. Both Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) develop 
bootstrapped adjusted t-statistics that account for cross-correlation. However, one simple 
solution for cross-correlation, that is strongly advocated for by Fama (1998) and Mitchell 
and Stafford (2000) is the CTP approach.  
 
Under the CTP approach, the performance of an event portfolio is tracked in calendar 
time relative to either an explicit asset-pricing model or reference portfolios. By forming 
event portfolios and estimating a time-series of portfolio return, the cross-sectional 
correlations of the individual event firm returns are automatically accounted for in the 
portfolio variance at each point in calendar time (Mitchell & Stafford, 2000), a significant 
improvement over the traditional BHAR model. Due to the absence of cross-sectional 
correlations of the individual event firm returns, the abnormal returns are also normally 
distributed under the CTP approach which allows for statistical inference (Mitchell & 
Stafford, 2000).  
  
Mandelker (1974) introduced the CTP approach to financial economics. Under the CTP 
approach, two variations exist. In the first variation, the performance of a portfolio of event 
firms is tracked in calendar-time relative to an explicit asset-pricing model (Mitchell & 
Stafford, 2000). The second variation is the Monthly Calendar-Time Abnormal Returns 
(MCTAR) used by authors such as Mandelker (1974), Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) and 
Andre, Kooli and L’Her (2004). Under this variation, for each calendar month, the 
abnormal return is calculated for each security using the returns on reference portfolios 
such as size and book-to-market portfolios used by Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) and 
Andre, Kooli and L’Her (2004). 
 
The CTP approach was criticized by Loughran and Ritter (2000) who claimed that since 
the CTP weights each time period equally, it has lower power to detect abnormal 
performance. Any differential abnormal performance in periods of high activity versus 
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periods of low activity will be averaged out by the regression approach making the CTP 
approach less likely to uncover abnormal performance (Loughran & Ritter, 2000). To 
address this flaw, calendar months can be weighting depending on the sample size of 
each monthly portfolio. Furthermore, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) found that the CTP 
approach has more power to detect for abnormal returns than the BHAR approach after 
accounting for cross-sectional dependence of individual-firm abnormal returns. 
  
Further criticism of the CTP approach comes from Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999). The 
potential for model misspecification leads their criticism of the CTP approach. Lyon, 
Barber and Tsai (1999) state that although the CTP approach controls well for cross-
sectional dependence, it remains sensitive to the bad model problem. According to Fama 
(1998), bad-model problems are of two types. Firstly, any asset pricing model such as the 
CAPM is simply a model and therefore does not completely describe expected returns 
(Fama, 1998). Secondly, Fama (1998) argues that even if there were a true model for 
expected returns, any sample period produces systematic deviations from the model’s 
predictions i.e. sample-specific patterns in average returns that are due to chance, 
resulting in a false anomaly. As a solution, Fama (1998) suggests the use of firm-specific 
models for expected return. The bad model problem is more significant using the BHAR 
approach because returns from the model are compounded (Fama, 1998). In conclusion 
of their paper, similar to Fama (1998), Mitchell and Stafford (2000) advocate for the use 
of the CTP approach as it has less statistical flaws than the BHAR approach. 
 
In contrast to the CAAR, BHAR and CTP approaches that use stock price movements to 
determine economic gains from M&A, researchers such as Healy, Palepu and Ruback 
(1992) use accounting data such as cash flows and other financial ratios. Their preference 
for accounting data is primarily motivated by capital market inefficiencies. However, 
Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) acknowledge that accounting data measures are 
imperfect since they are susceptible to managerial decisions. 
 
Parallel to the smaller body of work on long-term event studies, the bulk of empirical 
research involving event studies has mainly focused on short-term returns. The 
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underlying assumption in short-term event studies is that any lag in the response of stock 
prices to an event is short-lived, i.e. that markets are efficient (Fama, 1998). The Efficient 
Markets Hypothesis (EMH) states that stock prices reflect all available information and 
generation of abnormal returns is therefore impossible. According to Fama (1970), 
markets exhibit one of three forms of efficiency: weak form efficiency, which states that 
previous share prices cannot be used for prediction of future share prices, semi-strong 
efficiency, which implies that share prices efficiently adjust to all publicly available 
information and strong form efficiency, which suggests that all available information, 
including private information, is included in share prices.  
 
However, the growing body of long-term literature challenges this EMH assumption and 
argues that stock prices adjust slowly to corporate events (Fama, 1998). In the words of 
Brav (2000), recent studies in finance document long-run abnormal price reactions 
subsequent to numerous corporate activities. Evidence of long-run abnormal returns 
strongly rejects the notion of stock market efficiency.  
 
Still, Fama (1998) questions the existence of any reliable abnormal returns. Fama (1998) 
argues that many of the long-run anomalies that have been discovered in event studies 
are not robust across different methodologies. These anomalies include the size effect of 
Banz (1981), who found an inverse relationship between stock returns and firm size. 
Further evidence of anomalies is presented by Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein (1985) who 
found that prices on the NYSE are inefficient, since average returns on U.S. stocks are 
positively related to the ratio of a firm's book value of common equity to its market value 
(i.e. the book-to-market anomaly), while Carhart (1997) found a momentum anomaly. 
  
These anomalies, however, suffer from the joint-test problem: tests of whether abnormal 
returns are zero are also tests of whether the assumed model of expected or normal 
returns (i.e. the CAPM, market model, etc.) is correct (Khotari & Warner, 2005). Because 
asset pricing models have little empirical support, there is no consensus on how to 
measure long-term abnormal returns (Loughran & Ritter, 2000). Furthermore, Fama 
(1998) suggests that the bad model problem can present false anomalies. The bad-model 
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problem states that any asset pricing model, such as the CAPM, is just a model and 
therefore does not completely describe expected or normal returns, and that, even if a 
true model existed, any sample period produces systematic deviations from the model’s 
predictions that are due to chance, resulting in a false anomaly (Fama, 1998). 
  
Loughran and Ritter (2000) argue that researchers must choose between normative 
models such as the CAPM or positive models that control for variables such size and 
book-to-market. The difference between the two models is that tests of market efficiency 
require that a normative model be used as a benchmark whereas if a positive (empirically 
based) model is used, one is not testing market efficiency but rather whether any patterns 
that exist are being captured by other known patterns (Loughran & Ritter, 2000). As 
previously acknowledged, this study does not concern itself with market efficiency and 
will therefore be using a positive model.  
2.1.2 Normal return models 
A variety of models have been used to estimate normal or expected returns that serve as 
a benchmark for abnormal returns. This section begins with a discussion of international 
normal return models and then South African normal return models.  
2.1.2.1 International normal return models 
Beginning with the CAPM of Sharpe (1963), the model measures portfolio performance 
relative to the general market portfolio. In its essence, the CAPM embodies a theory of 
what can be inferred about expected returns when markets are in equilibrium and when 
all investors have homogeneous expectations and pursue a mean-variance optimising 
objective (van Rensburg & Robertson, 2003a). The CAPM is shown in the following form: 
 
Ri -rf = α + β (Rm - rf)       (2) 
 
where 
Ri is the return on a particular investment, i, 
rf is the return on a risk-free asset, 
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 Rm is the return on the market portfolio, 
β is the sensitivity parameter of the investment to the market and 
α is the excess return earned by the investment above the return on the market portfolio 
 
However, an important limitation of the CAPM is its consideration for only systematic risk 
when estimating expected returns. As a result, the CAPM as a model of expected returns, 
has been discredited, especially due to the discovery of various anomalies.   
  
According to Fama and French (1993), the most prominent anomaly is the size effect by 
Banz (1981) who found that market equity adds to the explanation of the cross-section of 
average returns provided by market. Furthermore, Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein (1985) 
report the book-to-market anomaly after they found prices on the NYSE are inefficient 
since average returns on U.S. stocks are positively related to the ratio of a firm's book 
value of common equity to its market value. In their study, Fama and French (1993) found 
anomalies of size, price-earnings ratio, leverage and book-to-market had strong individual 
relationships with the average returns realized on portfolios sorted according to these 
characteristics. However, the combination of size and book-to-market, seemed to 
describe the cross-section of average stock returns as well as absorbing the effects of 
leverage and the earnings-to-price ratio. In conjunction with the CAPM, the size and book-
to-market factors form the Fama and French model three factor model. Carhart (1997) 
further modified the Fama and French three factor model to include momentum, forming 
the Carhart four factor model.  
2.1.2.2. South African normal return models 
In South Africa, work on a normal return model began with van Rensburg and Slaney 
(1997), who advocate for the use of a two factor Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) model 
instead of the CAPM due to the market segmentation of the JSE. Market segmentation 
refers to the dichotomy in the return generating processes underlying JSE industrial and 
mining shares (van Rensburg, 2002). Van Rensburg and Slaney (1997) show that a two 
factor APT model comprising of the JSE Actuaries All Gold and Industrial indices has 
explanatory power for many cross-sectional irregularities on the JSE. Furthermore, their 
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two factor APT model was more appropriate for pricing assets on the JSE than the CAPM. 
These findings were reinforced in a subsequent study by van Rensburg (2002), with the 
two factors being updated to the JSE’s Financial & Industrials Index (JSE index code 
J213, colloquially known as the Findi) and the JSE’s Resources Index (JSE index code 
J210, colloquially known as the Resi) after the reclassification of the JSE.  
  
While van Rensburg and Slaney (1997) used factors related to macroeconomic variables 
to determine expected stock returns, studies by van Rensburg (2001) and van Rensburg 
and Robertson (2003b) have both examined the presence of style-based effects on the 
JSE. Using the portfolio approach of Fama and French (1993), van Rensburg (2001) finds 
anomalies associated with earnings yield, past twelve-month (positive) returns, market 
capitalisation, dividend yield, six months’ past returns, leverage, cash-flow to debt, 
turnover and three month's positive past returns. These anomalies persist even after risk-
adjustment using the two factor APT model of van Rensburg and Slaney (1997). The 
author finds price-to-earnings, market capitalisation and momentum variables form a 
parsimonious representation of style-based risk on the JSE.  
 
Employing the characteristic-based approach, which cross-sectionally regresses share 
returns over a particular period on values of various style characteristics, van Rensburg 
and Robertson (2003b) aimed to specify a style-based model of expected returns for the 
JSE. While this was their explicit aim, the authors state that their study can also be thought 
of as a 'multi-anomaly' test of the CAPM. In their study, they found CAPM anomalies of 
price-to-net asset value (NAV), dividend yield, price-to-earnings ratio, cash flow-to-price 
and size. Interestingly, much like the CAPM and in line with to van Rensburg (2001)’s 
findings, van Rensburg and Slaney (1997)’s two factor APT decomposition of risk did not 
succeed in removing the anomalies identified by van Rensburg and Robertson (2003b). 
Due to issues of multicollinearity among the values factors of cash flow-to-price, dividend 
yield, price-to-earnings, price-to-profit and price-to-NAV, the authors specified a two-
factor style-based model using size and price-to-earnings as explanatory variables for the 
cross-section of JSE returns.  
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The significance of the book-to-market variable in Fama and French (1993)’s study led 
Auret and Sinclaire (2006) to examine the robustness of van Rensburg and Robertson 
(2003b)’s Size-P/E model by including book-to-market as an explanatory variable. In line 
with Fama and French (1993), the authors found that the book-to-market variable plays 
a strong role in explaining variation in stock returns on the JSE. The book-to-market 
attribute remarkably rendered both the size and P/E variables totally insignificant. 
However due to high collinearity between the book-to-market attribute and other variables 
with high explanatory power such as dividend yield and cash flow-to-price, the authors 
support the use of the Size-P/E model of van Rensburg and Robertson (2003b), which 
boasts explanatory variables with very low correlation. 
  
Basiewicz and Auret (2009) examined the cross-section of average returns on the JSE 
using a data sample of all firms listed on the JSE from December 1989 to July 2005. 
Similar to Auret and Sinclaire (2006), the authors found the book-to-market variable to 
have significant explanatory power to predict returns. However, contrary to findings by 
Auret and Sinclaire (2006), the book-to-market variable in the author’s study did not 
render the size variable insignificant. Furthermore, the authors found the price-to-
earnings anomaly almost dissipates after adjusting for trading costs and illiquidity 
premiums. 
  
Basiewicz and Auret (2010) examined the feasibility of the Fama and French three factor 
model in South Africa by investigating whether it could explain the size and value effects 
on the JSE. By replicating Fama and French (1993)’s study, the authors found support 
for the use of the Fama and French three factor model on the JSE. 
  
More recent studies in South Africa report evidence of size, momentum and book-to-
market anomalies. Hoffman (2012) examined the presence of stock return anomalies for 
stocks listed on the JSE between 1985 and 2010. The author found size, book-to-market 
and momentum effects to be the most significant anomalies while Kruger (2014), who 
investigated return predictability on the JSE for the 2002-2009 sample period, found cash 
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flow-to-price, earnings yield (inverse of price-to-earnings), book-to-market, momentum 
and size were all significant variables in explaining return predictability.  
2.1.3 Conclusion 
While initial event studies on M&A and other corporate events focused on short-term 
returns around announcement dates, a growing body of work has investigated long-run 
returns to these events. Studies on long-run performance are, however, hampered by the 
shortcomings of the different methodologies used to estimate long-run returns and the 
accuracy and reliability of models used to estimate normal returns, i.e. the return that 
would be expected in the absence of the event. In the next chapter, in addition to briefly 
discussing prior research on short-term M&A studies, it is shown how the use of different 
methods and normal return models has impacted the outcome of various M&A studies 
around the globe.  
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Chapter 3: Literature review and hypothesis development 
As stated earlier, this study is primarily concerned with the long-run share return 
performance of South African acquirers, as this area of research remains largely 
unexplored. As such, short-run literature is only briefly discussed in this chapter.  With 
regards to long-term event studies, the main concern centers around the statistical 
robustness of the methodologies used and the measurement of expected returns, which 
serve as a benchmark for expected returns. The literature review begins by discussing 
short-run performance around M&A announcement dates. The attention then turns to 
long-run event studies. Findings from international and South African long-term M&A 
studies are then presented and the chapter concludes with a discussion on the 
determinants of abnormal returns for long-term post-merger performance and 
development of hypotheses. 
3.1 Short-term M&A event studies 
Researchers such as Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) argue that the most 
statistically reliable evidence on the value-creation of M&A for shareholders comes from 
short-term event studies. While long-term event studies are hampered by concerns about 
methodological choices and the joint-test hypothesis (tests of whether abnormal returns 
are zero are also tests of whether the assumed model of expected or normal returns is 
correct), this is not the case for short-run event studies (Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford, 
2001).  
 
The bulk of literature on short-run M&A returns reports positive abnormal returns to 
targets around M&A announcement dates (Agrawal & Jaffe, 2000). However, short-run 
M&A literature is inconclusive on the returns to bidders or acquirers. Furthermore, bidders 
and acquirers in developed markets seem to earn higher abnormal returns than their 
counterparts from emerging markets.   
 
Yilmaz and Tanyeri (2016) conducted one of the most comprehensive studies on returns 
around M&A announcement dates. The authors examined short-term returns to both 
bidders and targets in a global sample consisting of 263461 deals across 47 countries, 
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from 1992 – 2011. Their study found significant abnormal returns to both bidders and 
targets in both developing and emerging markets. However, their study also found a 
significant difference in returns to bidders in developed countries versus their emerging 
markets counterparts, with bidders from developed countries outperforming those from 
developing countries. The authors attribute this difference to two reasons.  
 
Firstly, developed markets are more efficient than emerging markets due to their higher 
liquidity, and also due to the greater political uncertainty in emerging economies. In a 
capital market that is efficient with respect to public information, stock prices quickly adjust 
following a merger announcement. The efficiency of developed capital markets is further 
illustrated in the findings of studies by Dutta and Jog (2009) and Mager and Meyer-Fackler 
(2017).  
 
Dutta and Jog (2009) examined 989 acquiring events involving Canadian firms between 
1993 and 2001. While their study finds significant positive abnormal returns around the 
announcement date, the Canadian market subsequently corrects for its initial positive 
reaction to news of the acquisition as abnormal returns become insignificant within 15 
days after the announcement date. 
 
Similarly, Mager and Meyer-Fackler (2017) investigated announcement date returns for 
338 German M&A transactions between 1981 and 2010. For most of their sample, the 
authors found no significant abnormal returns around M&A announcement dates. 
However, while their 2001-2010 sub-sample showed significant positive abnormal returns 
within five days of an M&A announcement, this was corrected for within 20 days of the 
announcement date.  
 
Secondly, Yilmaz and Tanyeri (2016) suggest that information leakages may account for 
lower abnormal returns in emerging market countries. If there are any information 
leakages, the effect of M&A announcements might be reflected in stock prices prior to the 
announcement date and as a result any abnormal returns around the announcement date 
insignificant.  
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The possibility of information leakage could potentially explain why studies on short-term 
returns to South African companies resulting from merger and acquisition deals found no 
significant abnormal returns. For example, Mushidzhi and Ward (2004) found no 
significant abnormal returns to bidders when they examined 57 M&A transactions 
between 1998 and 2002 over 3- and 21-day periods around announcement dates.  
 
Similarly, Smit and Ward (2007) did not observe any statistically significant abnormal 
returns from their study that examined 27 M&A between 2000 and 2002 over four event 
windows around the announcement date, i.e 21 days, 11 days, 5 days and 3 days. The 
proximity between the time frames used in the studies by Mushidzhi and Ward (2004) 
and Smit and Ward (2007) could be a possible explanation for the similarity in their results.  
 
Lastly, a more recent short-term study by Ndlovu (2017) had similar findings to the two 
previously discussed South African studies. The study did not find any significant 
abnormal returns from a sample of 34 M&A between 2003 and 2013 in the 21 days around 
announcement dates.   
  
3.2 Long-term M&A event studies 
This section of the literature review starts by providing an overview of long-term M&A 
studies outside South Africa that employ the aforementioned stock price movements 
methodologies, i.e. the CAAR, BHAR and CTP approaches and accounting measures 
such as returns on assets. The focus then turns to discussing findings from South African 
long-term M&A studies.  
  
3.2.1 International research 
The vast majority of research on M&A has been confined to developed countries 
(Ramakrishnan, 2008), specifically the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK) and 
Canada.  
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3.2.1.1 Stock price movement studies 
Early findings on the presence of long-term abnormal share returns from M&A are 
inconsistent. Mandelker (1974), Langetieg (1978) and Firth (1980) conducted the earliest 
investigations on M&A. While Mandelker (1974) and Langetieg (1978) examined M&A 
returns for New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) firms, Firth (1980) conducted one of the 
first major studies of mergers and takeovers in the UK. Mandelker (1974), Langetieg 
(1978) and Firth (1980) all found no significant abnormal returns from M&A. 
 
In contrast to Mandelker (1974) and Langetieg (1978), who conducted their studies using 
monthly returns, Asquith (1983) used daily abnormal returns to examine long-term post-
merger performance. Using a sample of 196 NYSE or American Stock Exchange (AMEX) 
acquirers in successful mergers with NYSE targets over the 1962-1976 period, Asquith 
(1983) found statistically significant CAARs of -0.072 in 240 days following the merger. 
Abnormal returns were calculated as the difference between the return on the merging 
firm and the return on a control portfolio with a similar beta.  
 
Using the same data but different methodologies, Bradley and Jarrell (1988) and 
Magenheim and Mueller (1988) reached different conclusions. Both Bradley and Jarrell 
(1988) and Magenheim and Mueller (1988) examined 78 NYSE/AMEX acquiring firms 
that completed takeovers worth at least $15 million over the 1976-1981 period. 
Magenheim and Mueller (1988) found significant CAARs in the three years following the 
merger. However, Bradley and Jarrell (1988) criticized their approach of using market 
parameter estimates based on monthly data as it is inefficient and non-stationary. Similar 
to Asquith (1983), Bradley and Jarrell (1988) used daily abnormal returns to examine 
post-merger performance. They calculated daily abnormal return as the difference 
between the merging firms return and the return on a portfolio of securities of similar beta 
and found insignificant CAARs of –0.16 over the first three post-acquisition years. 
 
Further inconsistency is highlighted in Franks and Harris (1989)’s study. Using a method 
similar to Firth (1980) but a larger sample size, Franks and Harris (1989) examined the 
returns to UK acquirers. While using the benchmarks of returns relative to the market 
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index and the CAPM resulted in statistically significant CAARs of 0.05 in the 24 months 
following the M&A, the CAARs of –0.126 were statistically significant under the market 
model. 
 
Up until this point, the literature was divided on the presence of any anomaly in long-run 
post-merger performance. To resolve this puzzle, Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) used 
a more robust set of benchmarks to proxy normal returns than prior studies. The authors 
justified the use of multifactor benchmarks from portfolio evaluation literature to overcome 
mean-variance inefficiencies of single factor benchmarks. The four benchmarks were; the 
Chicago Research in Security Prices (CRSP) equally-weighted index, the CRSP value-
weighted index, a ten-factor benchmark and an eight-portfolio benchmark which consists 
of four portfolios based on firm size, three based on dividend yield and one based on past 
returns. 
  
Using the CTP approach and examining 399 U.S. takeovers in the 1975-1984 period, the 
CRSP value-weighted index yielded and CRSP equally-weighted index yielded significant 
monthly abnormal returns of 0.3% and -0.2%. However, the ten-factor benchmark and an 
eight-portfolio benchmark yielded no significant abnormal returns. The authors hence 
conclude that there are no long-term post-merger abnormal returns and prior findings of 
negative post-merger returns are due to benchmark errors than mispricing at the time of 
the announcement. 
 
Most of the studies following Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) employ more robust 
benchmarks, with the majority providing stronger evidence for zero abnormal 
performance. Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelkar (1992) examined mergers over 1955 to 1987 
between NYSE acquirers and NYSE/AMEX targets. The authors also made a significant 
contribution to M&A long-term literature by suggesting an adjustment for firm size in M&A 
studies. The adjustment is particularly important in M&A studies because acquirers are 
usually large firms (Agrawal, Jaffe & Mandelkar, 1992). After adjusting for firm size and 
beta, they found that shareholders of acquiring firms suffer a statistically significant loss, 
with CAARs reaching –0.1026 by month +60. 
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However, the authors found that while five-year CAARs are significantly negative for 
mergers that took place in the 1950s, the 1960s and the 1980s, the CAARs are 
insignificantly positive over the 1970s period. Furthermore, when they examined the 
1975-1984 period from Franks et al. (1991), the authors also found no abnormal 
performance. This may suggest that M&A results are specific to the sample period. 
  
Following Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelkar (1992), Higson and Elliott (1993) considered the 
size effect in their study of completed UK takeovers between 1975 and 1990. The authors 
measured BHARs as opposed to the CAARs that had dominated M&A and other event 
studies since Fama et al. (1969). Abnormal returns were measured against a size 
benchmark. The authors found no evidence of significant abnormal stock price 
performance over the 36 months after takeover completion. 
  
In their paper, Loughran and Vijh (1997) examined 947 acquisitions from the NYSE, the 
AMEX, and NASDAQ between 1970 and 1989. Abnormal returns were measured as the 
difference between five-year holding period returns of sample stocks and matching stocks 
chosen to control for size and book-to-market effects. Using the BHAR approach, the five-
year abnormal returns were found to be marginally significantly different from zero after 
adjusting for cross-correlation in returns.  
 
The BHAR approach has however been criticized by Fama (1998), as well as Mitchell 
and Stafford (2000), for its susceptibility to cross-correlation of returns across events. 
They both advocate for the use of the CTP approach to mitigate this problem. In one of 
the most cited event studies, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) examined 2,193 acquisitions 
over the period 1961–1993 as part of their study using the BHAR and CTP approach. 
After adjusting for positive cross-correlations of individual event firm BHARs, there was 
no statistical evidence for abnormal returns. Mitchell and Stafford (2000) therefore 
suggest correction for positive cross-correlations of individual event firm under the BHAR 
approach using an adjusted t-statistic. From the CTP approach, they found acquirers tend 
to significantly underperform in the 3 years following the acquisition on an equal-weighted 
basis while there was no evidence for underperformance on a value-weighted basis. 
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Following Mitchell and Stafford (2000), a number of studies have used both methods to 
compare the significance of the difference in results, if any. 
 
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2003) examined a sample of 12,023 acquisitions by 
US public firms from 1980 to 2001 using both the CTP and BHAR approaches. For the 
CTP approach, the authors estimated normal returns using the Carhart four-factor model 
and from a three-year holding period, they found an insignificant monthly abnormal return. 
They also estimated the three-year BHAR by matching each sample firm to a firm based 
on the closest monthly market value of assets within the same yearly equity book-to-
market quintile measured one month after the completion of the transaction. They found 
acquiring firms to significantly underperform with abnormal returns of -16.02%. However, 
this could be due to the cross-correlation between returns suggested by Mitchell and 
Stafford (2000) and Fama (1998) that the authors did not make an adjustment for. 
  
Andre, Kooli and L’Her (2004) estimated long-term post-merger performance for 267 
Canadian M&A events between 1980 and 2000. The authors considered both variations 
of the CTP approach: the alpha coefficients from the Fama and French-Three Factor 
Model (FF-TFM) and the Mean Calendar-Time Abnormal Returns (MCTAR). The alpha 
coefficients from the FF-TFM approach reported a significant underperformance of -
0.523% per month when they measured the three-year post-acquisition abnormal return 
of the average Canadian acquirer using equal-weighted returns. The value-weighted 
returns yielded an unexpectedly positive three-year post- acquisition abnormal return of 
0.322% on average per month. When they examined MCTARs on an equal-weighted 
basis, acquirers earned significantly negative abnormal returns in the three years 
following the M&A, averaging -1% per month while on a value-weighted basis, the 
observed underperformance is statistically insignificant with a MCTAR average of -0.46% 
per month. 
  
For robustness, the authors address any possible cross-sectional dependence in their 
results by examining only non-overlapping cases. If an acquisition occurred within three 
years of a previously included acquisition by the same firm, the authors removed the latter 
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observation. With no overlapping cases, the results indicate that Canadian acquirers 
significantly underperformed using both the value-weighted and equal weighted 
schemes. Although the authors only report calendar-time results, they state that event-
time results do not significantly alter the overall conclusion they reach suggest that 
Canadian acquirers significantly underperform over the three-year post-event. 
  
Dutta and Jog (2009) investigated three-year stock return performance of 1300 Canadian 
M&A events in the 1993–2002 period starting from the effective date of a completed deal. 
For the BHAR approach, the authors considered two approaches to calculate expected 
returns: reference portfolio returns and control firm returns. The chosen benchmarks for 
the reference portfolio returns were the TSX 300 index return and the value-weighted 
Canadian Financial Market Research Center index (CFMRC) returns. The control firm 
returns where benchmarked with returns from matching firms selected based on the 
nearest propensity to the sample firms’ size and price-to-book-value factors. 
  
The authors found no significant abnormal results for the BHAR control firm approach 
after adjusting their t-statistics as suggested by Mitchell and Stafford (2000). However, 
the two reference portfolio approaches using the SX 300 index return and the value-
weighted Canadian Financial Market Research Center (CFMRC) index returns showed 
significant levels of underperformance (54% over three years) even with adjusted t-
statistics. The significant abnormal returns however disappear when the authors consider 
only non-overlapping acquisitions. The authors focus on the results from the control firm 
approach since it eliminates the new listing, rebalancing, and skewness biases. 
  
For the CTP approach, Dutta and Jog (2009) use the Fama and French three factor model 
as a normal return model. Consistent with the BHAR control firm approach, the CTP 
results did not show any evidence of long-term underperformance for Canadian acquiring 
firms. In summary, by using both the BHAR and CTP approach, the authors do not find 
any strong support for long-term underperformance for acquiring firms. 
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Mager and Meyer-Fackler (2017) examined the long-term performance of German 
acquiring firms for M&A transactions that took place between 1981 and 2010 for a 36-
month holding period using both the BHAR and CTP approaches. As reference portfolios 
for the BHAR approach, they chose the respective German industry indices, the German 
CDAX total return index, and European industry indices as they believed that industry-
adjusted returns best captured abnormal return effects in their sample. For the full sample 
period, no significant abnormal returns were found when they used the adjusted t-statistic 
suggested by Mitchell and Stafford (2000) that accounts for cross-sectional dependence 
and skewness. The CTP using the Carhart four factor model as a benchmark for expected 
results exhibited an overall insignificant positive alpha. In conclusion, their study did not 
find any significant negative abnormal long-term performance. 
 
Taken as a whole, studies that utilized stock price movement methodologies suggest zero 
abnormal returns for M&A acquirers in the long-run. Despite earlier studies suggesting 
the possibility of abnormal returns, findings from more recent studies that employ more 
robust methodologies and benchmarks indicate that there is no abnormal return.  
 
3.2.1.2 Accounting studies 
Although stock price movement studies have dominated M&A literature, some 
researchers have turned to accounting measures to determine the long-term performance 
of acquiring firms. According to Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992), stock price studies are 
unable to distinguish between real economic gains and market inefficiencies. Healy, 
Palepu and Ruback (1992) further argue that cash flows are representative of the actual 
economic benefits generated by assets following M&A. Specifically, Healy, Palepu and 
Ruback (1992) advocate for the use of pre-tax operating cash flows which exclude the 
effect of depreciation, interest expense and income, goodwill and taxes to ensure that 
their results are comparable over time. 
  
In their study, Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) investigated the 50 largest mergers 
between U.S. public industrial firms completed in the period 1979 to mid-1984 to 
determine the post-acquisition operating performance of merged firms. Using pre-tax 
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operating cash flow returns on assets to measure improvements in operating 
performance, they found merged firms had significant improvements in operating cash 
flow returns from the merger after controlling for industry. 
  
However, Switzer (1996) suggests that it is difficult to draw meaningful conclusions from 
the study by Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992). They argue that Healy, Palepu and 
Ruback (1992) analyzed a small sample of only very large mergers and dealt with the 
time period generally referred to as "merger mania". Switzer (1996) therefore uses a large 
sample of 324 acquisitions, drawn from the twenty-year time period of 1967-1987 and a 
similar methodology to Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992). In their study, Switzer (1996) 
found significant improvements in the operating performance of merged firms for a large 
sample of M&A over the 1967-1987 period hence concluding that the results presented 
by Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) were not biased by the size of their sample or the 
fact that they examined only mergers which occurred during the "merger mania" period. 
  
In contrast to Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) and Switzer (1996), who use pre-tax 
operating cash flows to estimate improvements in performance after M&As, Dickerson, 
Gibson and Tsakalotos (1997) use pre-tax profits as a proportion of the average opening 
and closing net assets to examine the impact of acquisitions on a panel of UK firms. They 
found M&A to have a negative long-term effect on profitability, as measured by return on 
assets. The authors examined the robustness of their findings by changing the rate-of-
return. They calculated the return on assets using operating profit and pre-tax profits less 
interest but found that these changes had no substantial effect on their initial findings. 
  
Further criticism of Healy, Palepu and Ruback’s (1992) study came from Ghosh (2001). 
The author argues that the use of operating performance from industry-median firms as 
a benchmark for outperformance of event firms is flawed. The author suggests that 
merging firms outperform industry-median firms over pre-acquisition years which implies 
that estimates of improvements in cash flow after the merger are biased upwards. As a 
benchmark for outperformance, the authors use control firms matched on performance 
and size from pre-event years. 
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Using Healy, Palepu and Ruback’s (1992) research design and a sample of large 
acquisitions between 1981 and 1995, the author finds merging firms’ post-acquisition 
operating cash flow performance increases significantly. However, the author also finds 
that merging firms systematically outperform industry-median firms over the pre-
acquisition period. There is no evidence of improvement in operating performance after 
accounting for any superior pre-acquisition performance, especially when firms are 
matched on pre-acquisition performance and size as a benchmark.  
  
The inconsistent findings in prior literature motivated Martynova, Oosting and Renneboog 
(2006) to investigate the long-term profitability of corporate takeovers of which both the 
acquiring and target companies are from Continental Europe or the UK. Martynova, 
Oosting and Renneboog (2006) criticize the use of pre-tax operating cash flows by Healy, 
Palepu and Ruback (1992), Ghosh (2001) and Switzer (1996). They argue that pre-tax 
operating cash flows ignore changes in working capital after M&A. The authors therefore 
employed four different measures of operating performance: Earnings before Interest, 
Tax, Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA) and EBITDA corrected for changes in 
working capital, each scaled by the book value of assets and by sale. Using a sample of 
European acquisitions that were completed between 1997 and 2001, Martynova, Oosting 
and Renneboog (2006) found the profitability of combined firms decreases significantly 
after M&A although the decrease becomes insignificant after controlling for size, industry 
and pre-acquisition performance using returns from peer companies. 
  
Using a sample of 87 domestic mergers, Ramakrishnan (2008) statistically analyzed cash 
flow accounting measures to study whether post-merger firm performance improved in 
the long-term. Similar to Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992), Ghosh (2001) and Switzer 
(1996), the author uses pre-tax operating cash flow returns scaled by operating assets of 
the sample firms to measure post M&A performance. The paired t-test is used to compare 
industry-adjusted cash flows of each of the three post-merger years against each of the 
three pre-merger years. The study finds that in the long-run, merged firms have improved 
performance. Further research by the author into the source of economic gains attributes 
it to enhanced efficiency in the utilization of assets and accrued synergistic benefits. 
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 Rao-Nicholson, Salaber and Cao (2015) examined the long-term performance of 57 M&A 
in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region between 2001 and 2012. 
The authors use pre-tax cash flows to calculate two measures of M&A performance: the 
combined return on assets (ROA), measuring the firms’ profitability, and the combined 
sales margin, calculating firms’ effectiveness. The authors calculated two benchmarks: 
the industry median control firm as well as a size and pre-acquisition performance control 
firm. Two performance measures and two control benchmarks resulted in four adjusted 
measures of operating performance. Similar to Ghosh (2001), the authors found that 
merging firms significantly outperformed their industry benchmark before the M&A. Only 
the industry adjusted ROA showed a significant decrease in operating performance 
between pre and post- acquisition performance. There was no significant 
underperformance for the other three measures of operating performance. 
  
3.2.2. South Africa 
In contrast to overseas markets, South African literature on long-term M&A performance 
is limited. However, similar to international studies, research on South African M&A is 
inconclusive on the presence of an anomaly although the majority of the studies suggest 
there is no significant return to acquirers to M&A in South Africa. Given the limited 
research on South African M&A, the study does not present accounting and stock price 
movement studies separately.  
 
Wimberley and Negash (2004) focused on M&A in the industrial sector as it accounted 
for a third of the M&A value between 1989 and 1998. Abnormal monthly returns were 
calculated as the difference between the return of the sample firm and the return on a 
benchmark portfolio that controlled for size and book-to-market value. The authors found 
a significant Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) of -10.5% in the first 36 months after the 
deal announcement date. 
  
Smit and Ward (2007) investigated the impact of 27 large acquisitions on the share price 
and operating financial performance of acquiring firms on the JSE during 2001-2003. The 
impact on operating financial performance was determined from cash flow return on 
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assets. Following Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992), the abnormal cash flow return on 
assets was determined by comparing the cash flow return on assets for each acquisition 
with the same period's median cash flow return on assets of the relevant acquiring 
company's industry sector (but excluding the cash flow return on assets of the relevant 
acquiring company). Based on the findings of insignificant changes in the industry-
adjusted operating financial performance of the acquiring firms on the JSE, the authors 
concluded that on average, large acquisitions create no wealth for their shareholders. 
  
While the impact of M&A of on the share price of acquiring firms in Smit and Ward (2007)’s 
study was short-term in nature, Kyei (2008) built on their work by examining the long-term 
impact of M&A on the share price of JSE acquiring firms. Using a similar methodology to 
Wimberley and Negash (2004), abnormal returns for 14 M&A transactions were 
calculated against a benchmark consisting of 12 factor portfolios that controlled for size 
(small, medium or large), price-to-book (value or glamour) and resource or non-resource 
firms. However, in contrast to Wimberley and Negash (2004), the authors calculated daily 
abnormal returns. With a positive but insignificant CAAR of 1,37% in 378 trading days 
after the merger, the study concluded that large acquisitions had statistically no impact 
on the long-term share price returns of JSE listed acquiring companies. Using identical 
methodology and control portfolios, Stafford (2012) found a positive but insignificant 
CAAR of 13.15% in 228 trading days after the merger when he examined 39 large 
acquisitions on the JSE. 
  
3.3. Determinants of the long-run performance of M&A deals 
The previous section of the literature review compared findings from M&A studies. Due 
to the different conclusions reached in these studies, several researchers have looked for 
explanations. In this segment, the various deal-specific and firm-specific factors that are 
typically discussed in the literature to explain the long-run performance of M&A deals are 
discussed. Such factors include; method of payment (stock, cash or both stock and cash), 
target type (public, private or subsidiary), type of activity (conglomerate or non-
conglomerate), deal attitude (friendly or hostile), the nature of acquirer (glamour or value) 
and target geography (cross border or non-cross border). 
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The method of payment hypothesis suggested by Myers and Majluf (1984) states that 
firms pay with equity when their stock is overvalued but pay with cash when their stock is 
undervalued. More recent studies by Loughran and Vijh (1997), Andre, Kooli and L’Her 
(2004) and Mager and Meyer-Fackler (2017) find support for the method of payment 
hypothesis, as equity-financed M&A underperformed. Dutta and Jog (2009) found support 
for the above hypothesis when using BHARs with the matching firm return benchmark, 
but do not find any strong evidence of underperformance from CTP approach alphas. 
  
Under the performance extrapolation hypothesis, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) suggest that 
the market over-extrapolates the glamour (low book-to-market) acquirers’ previous 
performance when assessing the value of a bid which translates into managers being 
more likely to overestimate their own abilities to manage an acquisition. On the other 
hand, managers of companies with value (high book-to-market) stocks will be more 
prudent in approving major acquisitions that may well determine the survival of the 
company and as a result of this prudence, they should create more value than destroy it 
(Rau & Vermaelen, 1998). This hypothesis was consistent with the results from their 
study: They found value acquirers to significantly outperform glamour acquirers by 25% 
when they examined 3169 merges that were effective between 1980 and 1991 for 
acquiring firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. Mitchell and Stafford (2000), 
Dutta and Jog (2009) and Mager and Meyer-Fackler (2017) find no evidence of reliable 
differential performance between glamour and value acquirers. The results of Andre, 
Kooli and L’Her (2004) support the performance extrapolation hypothesis, as glamour 
acquirers underperformed value acquirers. 
  
Numerous researchers report that conglomerate mergers underperform horizontal/ 
related mergers because managers are not familiar with the target industry (Andre, Kooli 
and L’Her, 2004). The aforementioned researchers suggest that horizontal mergers 
should benefit from synergies such as economies of scale and a stronger market share. 
From their sample, they found conglomerates underperform horizontal mergers in the 
long-run. Mager and Meyer-Fackler (2017) did not find any significance for the difference 
between long-term performance of horizontal mergers and conglomerate mergers while 
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Dutta and Jog (2009) found significant abnormal returns for horizontal mergers, but not 
for conglomerate mergers. 
  
The internalization theory states that cross-border M&A may help create value for 
acquiring firms if such firms tap into their expertise and know how on international markets 
(Francoeur, 2007). Francoeur (2007) finds that Canadian firms carrying out cross-border 
M&A do not generate significant abnormal returns in the five-year period after the 
announcement month. Andre, Kooli and L’Her (2004) find cross-border M&A to perform 
worse than non-cross-border M&A, while the findings of Mager and Meyer-Fackler (2017) 
and Dutta and Jog (2009) find no significance for the difference between cross-border 
and non-cross border M&A. 
  
Most studies reviewed for this research project did not analyze the listing effect of the 
acquired firm and its correlation with M&A returns. The published studies that did were 
short-term in nature. In the US, it is found that bidder shareholders gain when the bidding 
firm buys a private firm or a subsidiary of a public firm and lose when the bidder buys a 
public firm (see Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller, 2002; Chang and Tsai, 2013). These 
authors propose that this is because when bidders acquire private firms or subsidiaries, 
they are purchasing assets in a relatively illiquid market and hence the liquidity discount 
results in a higher return to bidder shareholders. Faccio, McConnell and Stolin (2006) 
investigated the listing effect in 17 Western European countries over the period 1996–
2001 and found that acquirers of public targets had an insignificant average abnormal 
return of −0.38%, while acquirers of unlisted targets earned a significant average 
abnormal return of 1.48%. 
  
Unsurprisingly, there is limited literature on the explanations of long-term performance of 
South African acquirers. The method of payment hypothesis has been the most 
researched. Smit and Ward (2007) found no significant differences between the operating 
financial performance of cash-funded acquisitions and share-funded acquisitions. 
Similarly, Stafford (2012) found no statistically significant difference between the CAARs 
of share-funded and cash -funded acquisitions for a 229-day event window. However, 
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even though this difference was insignificant, in line with the method of payment 
hypothesis, it was found that share-funded acquisitions performed better than cash -
funded acquisitions. 
3.4 Hypothesis development  
In this section, the study develops hypotheses based on theoretical principles and the 
findings from prior studies as discussed above.   
3.4.1. Short-term hypothesis.   
In the brief discussion on short-term returns to M&A candidates, the literature showed 
returns to short-term studies in developing countries are lower than those from developed 
countries. Yilmaz and Tanyeri (2016) show one explanation for this difference is the 
information leakages prior to M&A announcements in developing countries. As South 
Africa is considered a developing market, the possibility of information leakage suggests 
announcements of M&A have no short-run impact on the price of acquirers or merged 
firms and thus do not have any impact on the value creation for shareholders. The null 
hypothesis therefore states that announcements of M&A do not affect short-term 
shareholder value of the acquirer firms involved in the M&A transactions. The alternative 
hypothesis states that M&A announcements result in significant short-term abnormal 
returns for acquirers and therefore affect short-term shareholder value. The hypotheses 
are tested by using a two-sided t-test at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance. 
3.4.2. Long-term hypothesis 
While prior long-term studies on M&A were inconclusive on the presence of abnormal 
returns to acquirers, the majority of more recent studies that use more robust 
methodologies and normal return benchmarks find no significant abnormal returns to 
acquirers. As this study employs similarly robust methodologies and benchmarks that are 
appropriate for the South African equity market, the null hypothesis states that there is no 
significant long-run abnormal share return to South African acquirers. The alternative 
hypothesis states that there is significant long-run abnormal share returns to South 
African acquirers. The hypotheses are tested by using a two-sided t-test at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels of significance.  
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3.5. Conclusion of literature review 
In the literature review chapter, the study briefly discussed the literature on short-term 
M&A studies, focusing on the difference between returns to acquirers in developing 
countries in comparison to developed countries. The focus then turned to long-term 
studies where the significance of using different methodologies and benchmarks to 
calculate M&A long-term return was stressed. Various studies have drawn different 
conclusions on the impact of M&A on long-term firm performance. The lack of a general 
consensus from these studies as well as the different methodologies used makes it hard 
to draw a definitive conclusion on the impact of M&A on long-term firm performance both 
internationally and in South Africa. However, it was shown that while earlier studies were 
inconclusive on the presence of significant abnormal returns, the majority of more recent 
studies that utilize more robust methodologies and benchmarks find no significant 
abnormal long-term return to acquirers in M&A. Lastly, the possible explanations for the 
long-run performance were examined. The vast majority of the literature discussed are 
confined to developed countries. The long-term post-acquisition performance in South 
Africa remains largely unexplored.  
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Chapter 4: Data 
Three main datasets are used for the analysis of South African M&As. The first of these 
is the event data set comprising of South African M&A deals and their characteristics. The 
second is the time series of total returns generated by the entities in the event data set 
while the third data set constitutes the returns to the factors used in the normal return 
model against which abnormal returns are benchmarked.  
4.1. Event data set  
The event data set (i.e. the sample of South African M&A deals and their characteristics) 
is obtained from the Thomson Reuters Datastream terminal at the University of Cape 
Town main library. Event data meet the following criteria: 
  
1) Deals were effective between 2003 and 2014. In conducting event studies, 
practitioners need to be weary of the possibility that their results might be time 
varying. Using longer time periods might indicate results only present at a given 
point in time rather than consistent phenomena while shorter time periods restrain 
the applicability of the event study’s findings. For this study, 2003 is chosen as a 
starting point to limit any impact of the rebasing and replacement of the JSE 
Actuaries indices with the new joint venture FTSE/JSE Africa Index Series in 2002, 
as the study intends to use returns to JSE indices in its examination of returns to 
South African acquirers.  Given the long-term nature of the study, 2014 is chosen 
as a cut-off point so that post-event returns up to three-years can be investigated.   
 
2) Deals are mergers or acquisitions. All forms of acquisitions are considered, i.e. 
acquisitions of partial interest, acquisitions of remaining interest, acquisitions of assets 
and acquisitions of majority assets. 
    
3) Deals involve transactions greater than US$10 million. Following Andre, Kooli and 
L’Her (2004), this limitation is imposed to ensure that transactions are large enough 
to ensure that any economic gains are detectable.  
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4) Deal acquirers are public companies listed on the JSE to ensure that share prices, 
which are fundamental to measuring long-run performance, are readily available.  
 
5) Deals are completed.  
 
This set of criteria led to an initial sample of 291 deals. However, only acquirers with at 
least three-years of returns after completing a transaction can be considered for further 
analysis.  
4.2. Returns data set 
The time series of the total returns generated by the sample firms in the event data set is 
obtained from the Bloomberg terminal at the University of Cape Town main library. It is 
important to use total returns instead of only share price returns, as the dividends 
captured within the total return numbers are potentially directly or indirectly affected by 
the merger and acquisition transactions under consideration, and furthermore are an 
important part of the returns that shareholders receive from their investment. Only 
acquirers that were listed for a sufficient period to generate three year returns after the 
completion date of their M&A were considered for further analysis. This led to a final 
sample of 204 M&As. The descriptive statistics for this final sample are presented in 
Table 1 and Figure 1.  
  
Daily and monthly periods are the usual candidates for the computing of returns in the 
majority of M&A studies. However, statistical inference using daily returns, and to a lesser 
extent weekly returns, is hampered due to thin trading effects. Scholes and Williams 
(1977) highlight the problem of thin trading, where stocks that trade less frequently 
generate returns that are serially correlated. Thin trading effects are more profound on 
the JSE than exchanges in developed markets such as the NYSE and London Stock 
Exchange (LSE), where trading is more frequent than it is on the JSE.  
 
Since short-term studies investigate returns to acquirers in the few days following an 
announcement, daily returns have been utilized in the literature. The short-term segment 
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of this study therefore inevitably uses a daily return interval to analyze the impact of M&A 
announcements on acquirers. However, with respect to the long-term segment, a monthly 
return interval is preferred. This interval is chosen over the daily and weekly intervals to 
mitigate the impact of thin trading effects on returns from sample firms.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for acquirers 
Panel A. Top 10 transactions 
Date Effective Acquirer Name Target Name 
Deal 
Size 
 (M USD) 
9/14/2006 MTN Group Ltd Investcom LLC 5237.001 
8/1/2014 Woolworths Holdings Ltd David Jones Ltd 2096.249 
3/28/2011 Capital Property Fund Ltd Pangbourne Properties Ltd 1832.753 
4/26/2004 Anglogold Ltd Ashanti Goldfields Co Ltd 1743.808 
3/18/2011 Steinhoff International Holdings Ltd Conforama SA 1653.424 
12/1/2006 Gold Fields Ltd Barrick Gold South Africa (Pty) Ltd 1524.999 
9/1/2011 Hyprop Investments Ltd Attfund Retail Ltd 1313.744 
7/1/2009 Redefine Income Fund Ltd ApexHi Properties Ltd 1105.872 
12/31/2008 Sappi Ltd M-real Corp-Coated Graphic Paper Business 1081.782 
6/10/2011 Sasol Ltd Talisman Energy Inc-Cypress A Assets, 
British Columbia 
1062.692 
 
Panel B. Distribution by year 
Year No of deals 
Total deal value  
(M USD)  
Average deal value 
(M USD) 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
 
17 
13 
9 
21 
21 
16 
20 
17 
15 
18 
20 
17 
 
4897.03 
1302.79 
1267.42 
9399.73 
2666.51 
2331.07 
2141.31 
5803.25 
4530.02 
2134.73 
3680.15 
4447.41 
 
288.06 
100.21 
140.82 
447.61 
126.98 
145.69 
107.07 
341.37 
302.00 
118.60 
184.01 
261.61 
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Panel C. Frequency distribution of deal characteristics. 
Target nation 
 
 
Method of payment 
 
 
 
Industry relatedness 
 
 
Percentage acquired 
 
 
Deal attitude 
 
 
 
 
Form of transaction 
 
 
 
 
 
Target's listing status 
 
South Africa 
Other 
 
Cash 
Equity 
Cash and Equity 
 
Yes 
No 
 
50% or more 
Less than 50% 
 
Friendly 
Hostile 
Unsolicited 
Neutral 
 
Merger 
Acquisition of remaining interests 
Acquisition of partial interests 
Acquisition of majority assets 
Acquisition of assets 
 
Public 
Private 
Subsidiary 
 
107 
  97 
 
149 
  19 
  36 
 
104 
100 
 
131 
  73 
 
180 
     1 
     1 
   22 
 
  60 
  20 
  48 
  34 
  42 
 
  68 
  57 
  79 
 
 
The sample consists of 204 observations for acquiring firms between 2003 and 2014. For acquiring firms, all events 
are considered in case of multiple acquisitions by the firm in any year. ‘‘Deal size” is the total transaction value in million 
US dollars. ‘‘Target nation” is a dummy variable with a value of ‘‘1” if the target is from South Africa and ‘‘0” otherwise. 
‘‘Method of payment” is a categorical variable outlining the nature of transaction payment mode. Three categories are 
created: cash payment, equity payment and a combination of cash and equity. ‘‘Industry relatedness” is a dummy 
variable. For acquisitions within the same industry, the value is ‘‘1” and ‘‘0” otherwise. “Percentage acquired is a dummy 
variable: “1” represents the acquisition of 50% or more of the target company, and “0” otherwise. “Deal attitude” is a 
categorical variable with four categories: friendly, hostile, unsolicited and neutral. ‘‘Form of transaction” is a categorical 
variable with five categories: merger, acquisition of remaining interests, acquisition of partial interests, acquisition of 
majority assets and acquisition of assets. ‘‘Target’s listing status” is a categorical variable outlining the nature of target 
firm. Three categories are created: public target, private target, and subsidiaries 
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Figure 1. The number of transactions and total deal value in millions of US Dollars. 
 
Figure 1 highlights the impact of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) on South African M&A 
activity, as both total deal value and the number of deals reduced between 2007 and 
2010. From 2011 onwards, the general trend has been an increase in both total deal value 
and number of deals, perhaps indicating a shift in business confidence after the GFC.   
4.3 Normal return model data set 
The normal return model data set consists of the returns to factors used to benchmark 
returns from South African acquirers. The preferred factors for this study are the JSE’s 
Financial & Industrials Index (JSE index code J213 or Findi), the JSE’s Resources Index 
(JSE index code J210 or Resi), size and value variables. Returns to the Findi and Resi 
indices are obtained from the Bloomberg terminal from the University of Cape Town main 
library while the size and value returns were downloaded from the Peregrine Securities 
Research South African factor data library. The justification for this factor selection is 
discussed in Chapter 5. In Chapter 5, the use of the three data sets to determine the 
performance of South African M&A in both the short and long-run is discussed.  
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Chapter 5: Methodology and results 
This chapter begins with the justification of the normal return model that was briefly 
introduced in Chapter 4.3 and then proceeds to describe the methodology followed and 
the results of the investigation aimed at answering the three research questions forming 
the basis of this study. Firstly, how do South African acquirers share returns perform in 
the short-run? Secondly, how do South African acquirers perform in the long run in terms 
of share returns? To answer this question, the study considers both the BHAR and CTP 
approaches. Thirdly, what correlations exist between long-run share performance and 
specific selected attributes of merger and acquisition transactions? The study thus breaks 
the sample down into a number of possible determinants that are analyzed for possible 
explanations of the long-term performance of South African acquirers. The software used 
for this research is Event Study Metrics (see www.eventstudymetrics.com). 
5.1 Normal return model 
In selecting a model for normal returns, practitioners of event studies need to be cautious 
to avoid the bad model problem underlined in Fama’s (1998) study. A bad normal return 
model is one that does not fully describe expected or normal returns. Even though bad 
models are ubiquitous, they are more severe for studies with longer horizons, since errors 
in expected returns grow faster with the return horizon than the volatility of returns (Fama, 
1998). Practitioners therefore need to select the most robust and persistent factors for 
their normal return model. For the South African equity market, various researchers 
provide evidence against the use of the CAPM as a normal return model due to the 
discovery of various anomalies, the failure of market beta to predict returns and the 
market segmentation of the JSE.  
 
The most common and persistent anomalies on the JSE are size and value effects. In the 
words of Strugnell, Gilbert and Kruger (2011), value effects are those linked to measures 
of the stock price being out of line with fundamental indicators of firm value, such as book 
value of assets or earnings while the size effect speaks to the outperformance of smaller 
firms, as measured by market capitalisation, in comparison to larger firms. In the literature 
reviewed in Chapter 3, beginning with the study on CAPM anomalies by van Rensburg 
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and Robertson (2003b), Auret and Sinclaire (2006), Basiewicz and Auret (2009), 
Basiewicz and Auret (2010), Hoffman (2012) and Kruger (2014) all find evidence of size 
and value anomalies.  
 
Further evidence against the CAPM and using a market proxy such as the ALSI for 
predicting returns comes from van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a). Their study found 
that the market beta, using the FTSE-JSE All share index as a market proxy, has no 
predictive power for returns on the JSE and if anything, had an inverse relationship with 
returns. Strugnell, Gilbert and Kruger (2011) further substantiate these findings in their 
study and conclude that beta, using the FTSE-JSE All share index as a market proxy, is 
irrelevant as far as return generation on the JSE is concerned.  
 
In addition to the aforementioned reasons, the CAPM is not suitable for return prediction 
in South Africa due to the market segmentation of the JSE. Van Rensburg (2002) 
describes “market segmentation” as the dichotomy in the return generating processes 
underlying JSE industrial and mining shares. This unique feature of the JSE was 
announced to South African literature by Gilbertson and Goldberg (1981), who suggested 
reformulating the market model index to include a mining and an industrial factor. Van 
Rensburg and Slaney (1997) reformulate the market index and show that a two factor 
APT Model comprising of the JSE Actuaries All Gold and Industrial indices has 
explanatory power for many cross-sectional irregularities on the JSE and was more 
appropriate for pricing assets on the JSE than the CAPM. With the reclassification of the 
JSE in March 2000, van Rensburg (2002) updated the two factor APT to the Findi and 
Resi indices. 
 
At this point, it is quite clear that the study cannot make use of the CAPM or any other 
model that incorporates a market proxy. The study therefore turns to the findings of van 
Rensburg (2001) and van Rensburg and Robertson (2003b) and the recommendation of 
van Rensburg (2001) in selecting a normal return model. As previously stated in the 
literature review, studies by van Rensburg (2001) and van Rensburg and Robertson 
(2003b) have both examined the presence of style-based effects on the JSE. While van 
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Rensburg (2001) found price-to-earnings, market capitalisation and momentum variables 
to form a parsimonious representation of style-based risk on the JSE, van Rensburg and 
Robertson (2003a) specified a two-factor style-based model using size and price-to-
earnings as explanatory variables for the cross-section of JSE returns. In both studies, 
these anomalies persisted even after risk-adjustment from the two-factor APT model of 
van Rensburg and Slaney (1997). In conclusion of his paper, van Rensburg (2001) 
recommended augmenting the two factor APT model of van Rensburg and Slaney with 
CAPM anomalies. This study follows this recommendation.  
 
However, while van Rensburg (2001) and van Rensburg and Robertson (2003b) 
recommend price-to-earnings as a value proxy, South African returns for this risk factor 
are not readily available. The study therefore uses book-to-market returns as a proxy for 
value as its returns are readily available in the Peregrine Securities Research South 
African factor data library. Therefore, the normal return model used in the study augments 
the two factor APT model of van Rensburg (2002) with size and book-to-market variables 
forming a normal return model of the Findi, the Resi, size and book-to-market.    
 
As previously stated, the size and book-to-market factor returns are obtained from the 
Peregrine Securities Research South African factor data library. Size is simply the market 
capitalisation value of the stock as at the end of the previous month while the book-to-
market ratio is computed by taking the most recent book value six months prior to the 
current month and dividing it by the market value as at the end of the previous month. 
The returns to the size and book-to-market variables are then calculated using the two-
way portfolio sort approach in the following three steps.  
 
Firstly, all stocks on the FTSE/JSE ALSI index are ranked based on size, using the 50th 
percentile as breakpoint to create two subsets of stocks: Big and Small. The stocks are 
then independently ranked based on their respective book-to-market scores, using the 
30th and 70th percentiles as breakpoints to create three subsets of stocks: Low, Neutral 
and High. Six equal-weighted or cap-weighted portfolios i.e. Big Low, Big Neutral, Big 
High, Small Low, Small Neutral and Small High are created using each size/value pair 
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depending on the defined breakpoints. Value returns are then calculated as the average 
return of the two High portfolios minus the average return of the Low portfolios. Similarly, 
the size returns are calculated by going long the Big portfolios and short the Small 
portfolios.  
5.2. Short run performance 
The study uses the standard-event study methodology of Fama et al. (1969) to calculate 
returns around announcement dates. The first step in using this methodology is to 
calculate the so-called Abnormal Return, AR, as the difference between realized and 
expected returns for each security in the sample at each point in time as shown in 
Equation 3: 
 
AR𝑖t = 𝑅it – (𝑅it)                                     (3)  
Where, Rit is the actual return and (Rit) is the expected or normal return 
 
Given that the examination of returns to M&A in this section is short-term in nature, this 
study makes use of daily ARs. The average ARs for each day are then calculated to give 
Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) for all securities on each day in the event window as 
shown in Equation 4: 
 
AAR𝑡𝑡 = 1/N ∑Ni=1 ARit                             (4) 
. 
Lastly, the AARs are summed up for each day in the event window to give the Cumulative 
Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) as shown in equation 5: 
 
CAARt = CAARt-1 + AARt                        (5)  
 
However, to calculate abnormal returns (i.e. returns attributable to the event of interest), 
normal (or expected) returns need to be estimated first. Normal returns are returns that 
would be expected in the absence of the event of interest. As discussed in Chapter 5.1, 
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the study makes use of four factors to estimate normal returns for South Africa, i.e. the 
Findi, the Resi, size and book-to-market. However, daily returns to the size and book-to-
market risk factors for the South African equity market are not readily available. The study 
therefore only uses the Findi and the Resi as an estimate of short term expected returns.  
 
According to van Rensburg (2002), individual company returns are influenced by either 
the Findi or the Resi, but seldom by both. The study therefore matches each firm in the 
event dataset to the factor (Findi or Resi) that influences its returns based on whether it 
is a resource or a non-resource stock. Resource stocks are matched to the Resi while 
non-resource stocks are matched to the Findi.  
 
The next step in calculating short-term CAARs is determining the estimation window. An 
estimation window is the period of trading days before the announcement date that is 
used to estimate the expected return for each asset and each announcement (Event 
Study Metrics [ESM], n.d.). While there is no general consensus with respect to the length 
of the estimation window, most studies use an estimation window of 180 or 200 trading 
days ending either 10 or 20 days prior to the event (ESM, n.d.). However, the end date of 
the estimation window should depend on the likelihood of information leakage of the event 
of interest. In light of the possibility of information leakage in emerging markets reported 
in Yilmaz and Tanyeri’s (2016) study, the estimation window in this study needs to end 
earlier than the 10 or 20 days used in most studies. ESM (n.d.) finds that M&A event 
studies often use 40 trading days prior to the M&A announcement as the end date for the 
estimation window. Consequentially, the study uses a 200-trading day estimation window 
ending 40 days prior to the event date. 
 
Lastly, this study estimates CAARs over eight event windows. An event window is the 
period of trading days over which abnormal returns are calculated. The event windows 
are: (-40,40), (-30,30), (-20,20), (-10,10), (-5,5), (0,10), (0,20) and (0,30). Since many 
acquirers make multiple acquisitions, there is a possibility that returns from one 
acquisition will overlap with those from another acquisition resulting in cross-correlation 
in their returns. Therefore, the Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) test statistic that corrects for 
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cross-correlation is used in determining the significance of the CAARs. Furthermore, the 
study takes into consideration thin trading effects on the JSE. Consequentially, for its 
estimators, the study prefers the Scholes/Williamson estimation method, that corrects for 
thin trading effects, over the commonly used Ordinary Least Squares.  
 
Figure 2 illustrates and Table 2 reveals announcement date returns for the eight event 
windows, as well as their p-values. Only the (−5, +5) event window has a significant 
positive return of 0.0168 (p-value = 0.0082), which is corrected over the 10-day post-
announcement window. All other event window CAARs are not significantly different from 
zero.  
 
 
Figure 2. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns estimated using the two factor APT 
(Findi & Resi).   
 
The constant mean return model, which estimates the mean return of an asset over a 
period of time (the estimation window) as an estimate of the expected return of the asset, 
is used to corroborate results from the two-factor APT. As shown in Table 2, the results 
of the constant mean return model are similar to those of the two-factor APT. When using 
the constant mean return model, only the (−5, +5) event window has a significant positive 
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return of 0.0172 (p-value = 0.002). However, the market subsequently corrects for the 
initial positive reaction to news of the acquisition as CAARs become insignificant within 
10 days after the announcement date. Figure 3 illustrates the results from the constant 
mean return model.  
 
Thus overall, the results from both the constant mean return model and two-factor APT 
consisting of the Findi and the Resi indicate that initial overreaction in the South African 
market is followed rather quickly by a negative correction (i.e. negative abnormal returns) 
within ten days of the announcement date, and possibly much earlier than the effective 
date. 
 
Figure 3. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns estimated using the constant mean 
return model.  
 
Table 2. Short-run cumulative abnormal return 
 
Two-factor APT Constant mean return model.  
Period CAAR P-value CAAR P-value 
(-40...40) 0.0218 0.2049  0.0089 0.4159 
(-30...30) 0.0109 0.4256  0.0018 0.8518 
(-20...20) 0.0103 0.3344  0.0027 0.7378 
(-10...10) 0.0087 0.2757  0.0063 0.3401 
(-5...5) 0.0168 0.0082 ***  0.0172 0.0020 *** 
(0...10) 0.0031 0.6092  0.0040 0.4336 
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(0...20) 0.0029 0.6981 -0.0021 0.7475 
(0...30) 0.0005 0.9523 -0.0055 0.4397 
 
The constant mean return model and two-factor APT are used to determine the abnormal return and adjusted abnormal 
return. The study uses an estimation window of 200 days. While most studies end their estimation windows 10 or 20 
days prior to the event, this study is weary of the possibility of information leakage in emerging markets (see Yilmaz 
and Tanyeri, 2016). The estimation window used in this study therefore ends 40 days prior to the announcement date 
to account for the possibility of information leakage. Eight event windows are estimated: (-40, 40), (-30, 30), (-20, 20), 
(-10, 10), (-5, 5), (0, 10), (0, 20) and (0, 30). CAAR is the summation of the average abnormal returns for each stock 
for a specific event window. The statistical significance of the abnormal return was examined by test statistics 
introduced by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) that corrects for cross-sectional correlation in stock returns. This adjustment 
was necessary since many acquirers make multiple acquisitions. CAAR results are reported in decimals (not in %). *, 
** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
5.3. Long-run performance 
The long-run performance of South African acquirers is measured using both the BHAR 
and CTP approaches. The results from these BHAR and CTP methodologies are 
determined in sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 respectively.  
5.3.1. BHAR approach 
The BHAR approach estimates abnormal return as the difference between the long-run 
compounded buy-and-hold return of a sample firm less the long-run compounded return 
of an appropriate benchmark. The first step in implementing the BHAR approach is 
determining an appropriate benchmark for abnormal returns. This study considers the 
three options suggested by Barber and Lyon (1997): a reference portfolio such as the 
market index, a control firm benchmark, where sample firms are matched to a similar firm 
on the basis of specified firm characteristics such as size and book-to-market, and an 
asset pricing benchmark such as the Fama and French three-factor model.  
 
However, using a reference portfolio such as a market index as benchmark yields three 
biases; the new listing bias, the rebalancing bias and the skewness bias. As discussed in 
the literature review, the new listing bias arises as a mismatch between sample firms that 
have long post-merger returns and newly listed firms in the reference portfolio that began 
trading subsequent to the event month, the rebalancing bias arises since the 
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compounded returns of a reference portfolio are typically calculated assuming periodic 
rebalancing while the returns of sample firms are compounded without rebalancing and 
the skewness bias arises since while it is common to observe a sample firm with an 
annual return in excess of 100%, it is uncommon to observe a return on the market index 
in excess of 100%, resulting in skewed abnormal returns (Barber & Lyon, 1997). The 
skewness bias also leads to Fama’s (1998) criticism of using an asset pricing benchmark 
such as the Fama and French three-factor model. The biases induced by using a 
reference portfolio approach imply that for the BHAR approach, the study cannot make 
use of the normal return model described in Chapter 5.1 that comprises of the Findi, the 
Resi, size and value factors.    
  
As a solution to the biases that inhibited the use of the reference portfolio approach, 
Barber and Lyon (1997) proposed the use of the control firm approach, which matches 
sample firms to control firms of similar size and book-to-market value. The control firm 
approach yielded well-specified test statistics as it eliminated the new listing bias (since 
both the sample and control firms must be listed in the event month), the rebalancing bias 
(since both the sample and control firms’ returns are calculated without rebalancing) and 
the skewness bias (since both the sample and control firms are equally likely to have 
large positive returns) (Barber & Lyon, 1997).   
 
In pursuit of the most accurate results, the mentioned study applied the more robust 
control firm approach that matches sample firms against same-industry firms that have 
similar characteristics, such as firm size and book-to-market values, but did not engage 
in M&A. However, due to the relatively small size of the JSE in contrast to overseas 
markets, the control firm approach is not feasible in the South African context. In their 
study on the long-run M&A performance of German acquirers, Mager and Meyer-Fackler 
(2017) run into a similar problem. To mitigate this problem, the authors matched each 
sample firm with its respective industry index. The study therefore takes a similar 
approach to that of Mager and Meyer-Fackler (2017). 
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The JSE is classified into ten broad industries; Oil and Gas, Basic Materials, Industrials, 
Consumer Goods, Health Care, Consumer Services, Telecommunication, Utilities, 
Financials and Technology. Each firm in the event dataset is therefore matched to its 
respective industry index over the event window considered for the particular merger or 
acquisition.  
 
For the BHAR analysis, a skewness- adjusted test statistic is used to mitigate the 
skewness bias. One-year, two-year and three-year BHARs are -0.0579 (p-value 
=0.0097), -0.0746 (p-value = 0.0956) and -0.1203 (p-value = 0.0485) per month, 
respectively. All three years have significant BHARs at the five percent level. These 
results are reported in Panel A of Table 3 and illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Equal-weighted Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns from the overlapping sample 
 
However, Loughran and Ritter (2000) report that abnormal returns disappear when 
returns are value-weighted. The study therefore examines value-weighted abnormal 
returns. Value-weighted BHARs are calculated based on the market value of the acquiring 
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firm at the effective date of acquisition. The monthly one-year, two-year and three-year 
value-weighted BHARs for were -0.0413 (p-value = 0.0628), -0.0627 (p-value = 0.1561) 
and -0.01291 (p-value = 0.0357). The negative BHARs were robust to the value-weighted 
adjustment over the one and three-year holding periods. Abnormal returns to South 
African acquirers therefore appear to be negative. These results are reported in Panel A 
of Table 3 and illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5. Value-weighted Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns from the overlapping sample 
 
The last adjustment made to enhance the robustness of the findings from the BHAR 
approach is for cross-correlation. Mitchell and Stafford (2000) suggest that the BHAR 
approach in its traditional form results in overstated test statistics and an adjustment 
should be made for positive cross-correlation of individual firm BHARs. In their study, 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) found that cross-correlation in returns resulted in overstated 
test statistics that indicated false significant abnormal returns. Two adjustments are made 
for cross-correlation. Firstly, the study uses the test statistic proposed by Kolari and 
Pynnönen (2010) that corrects for cross-correlation. Secondly, only non-overlapping 
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cases are considered. Any acquisition that occurred within three years of a previously 
included acquisition by the same firm is excluded from the sample. The adjustment for 
non-overlapping events results in a final sample of 121 M&A.  
 
For the non-overlapping sample, only value-weighted returns are examined. Using the 
Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) test statistic, the value-weighted returns to acquirers remain 
negative but lose their significance, over all holding periods. The value-weighted one-
year, two-year and three-year monthly BHARs are 0.0004 (p-value = 0.9893), -0.0269 (p-
value = 0.5795) and -0.0283 (p-value = 0.7399), respectively. These results are reported 
in Panels B of Table 3 and illustrated in Figure 6. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Value-weighted Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns from the non-overlapping 
sample 
 
At this point, given the robustness measures taken in the non-overlapping sample, there 
appears to be no evidence of abnormal returns to South African acquirers when using the 
BHAR approach. 
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In conclusion of the examination of abnormal returns using the BHAR approach, the non-
overlapping sample is separated into two broad groups. These groups are based on the 
market segmentation of van Rensburg and Slaney (1997) and van Rensburg (2002). In 
these two studies, it was shown that individual returns of each firm on the JSE are 
influenced by either the Findi or the Resi but seldom by both. The study therefore 
examines returns to firms belonging to industries influenced by the Resi separately from 
those belonging to industries influenced by the Findi. These two broad groups are 
classified as resources stocks and financial and industrial stocks, respectively. Value-
weighted returns for both groups are examined using the Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) 
test statistic that adjusts for cross-correlation in stock returns.   
 
For financial & industrial stocks, one-year, two-year and three-year monthly BHARs are 
0.0475 (p-value = 0.1618), 0.0786 (p-value = 0.1732) and 0.0876 (p-value = 0.3034). 
Interestingly, however, the BHARs for resource stocks are significantly negative. One-
year, two-year and three-year monthly BHARs are -0.1679 (p-value = 0.0688), -0.4541 
(p-value = 0.0015) and -0.5502 (p-value = 0.0028).  
 
Table 3. BHAR results 
Panel A. Overlapping equal-weighted and value-weighted BHARs 
Holding period  
(months) 
Equal-weighted BHAR Value-weighted BHAR 
 
12 months 
 
-0.0579 ***  
(0.0097) 
 
-0.0413 * 
(0.0628) 
 
24 months 
 
-0.0746 *  
(0.0956) 
 
-0.0627   
(0.1561) 
 
36 months 
 
-0.1203 **  
(0.0485) 
 
 
-0.1291 **  
(0.0357) 
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Panel B. Non-overlapping value-weighted BHARs 
Holding period  
(months) 
Value-weighted BHAR  
 
 
12 months 
 
-0.0033  
(0.9118) 
 
  
 
 
24 months 
 
-0.0289  
(0.5537) 
 
 
36 months 
 
 0.0200  
(0.7793) 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C. Non-overlapping value-weighted BHARs for Financials & Industrials and Resources 
Holding period  
(months) 
BHAR- Financials & Industrials BHAR- Resources 
 
12 months 
 
0.0475 
(0.1618) 
 
-0.1679 * 
(0.0688) 
 
24 months 
 
0.0786 
(0.1732) 
 
-0.4541 ** 
(0.0015) 
 
36 months 
 
0.0876 
(0.3034) 
 
 
-0.5502 ** 
(0.0028) 
 
BHAR is the buy-and-hold abnormal return measured as the average difference in the compounded return between a 
sample firm and a benchmark over a 12, 24 and 36-month holding periods starting after the effective month of 
acquisition. The study had 204 overlapping cases and 121 non-overlapping cases. If a firm makes acquisitions within 
three years of a previous acquisition, these acquisitions were considered ‘overlapping’. Otherwise, events are 
considered ‘‘non-overlapping” cases. Value-weight BHAR is calculated based on the market value weight of the 
acquiring firm at the effective date of acquisition. T-Statistics and adjusted t-statistics are reported. A skewness-
adjusted t-statistics accounts for skewness and a Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) test statistic is used to correct for cross-
sectional dependence in stock returns. BHAR values are monthly returns expressed in decimals not in percentages. *, 
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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5.3.2. CTP approach 
To corroborate the findings from the BHAR approach, the study considers the more 
statistically robust Calendar-Time Portfolio approach. This approach is recommended 
ahead of the BHAR, primarily due to the cross-correlation in returns from the BHAR 
approach that results in skewness and non-normality of BHAR returns, therefore 
hindering statistical inference of BHAR returns.  
 
The CTP method is implemented by calculating returns from a portfolio of firms engaging 
in M&A. For each calendar month over the entire sample period (2003-2014), a portfolio 
comprising of all firms that experienced M&A is constructed. Portfolios are rebalanced 
monthly to drop all companies that reach the end of their holding period (one-year, two-
year and three-year holding periods are considered) and add all companies that have just 
undergone an M&A. According to Mitchell and Stafford (2000), by constructing event 
portfolios and estimating a time-series of portfolio returns, the cross-sectional correlations 
of the individual event firm returns are automatically accounted for in the portfolio variance 
at each point in calendar time. The time series of the monthly returns from the portfolio   
and the normal return model comprising of the Findi, the Resi, size and value are used to 
determine abnormal returns using the following regression:  
 
Rp,t - Rr,t = αp + β(Rfindi,t-Rr,t) + β(Rresi,t-Rr,t) + β(SMBt) + B(HMLt) + е              (3) 
 
where, 
Rp,t  is the  return on the monthly M&A portfolio, 
Rr,t  is the return on 91-day South African Government Treasury bills, 
αp is the abnormal return, 
Rfindi is the return on the Findi, 
Rresi is the return on the Resi, 
SMB is the size factor return, 
HML is the book-to-market factor return and 
β is the loading of the portfolio on each independent variable.  
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The analysis of the long-run abnormal returns results of South African acquiring firms 
focuses on the alpha coefficients from the regression. When one-year, two-year and 
three-year post-acquisitions abnormal returns of South African acquirers are measured, 
the study finds insignificant positive performance of 0.0008 (p-value=0.7281), 0.00015 (p-
value=0.50716) and 0.0021 (p-value=0.339), per month respectively. A small but positive 
alpha performance signifies that South African acquirers do not destroy shareholder value 
and, if anything, create shareholder value. However, the robustness of these findings is 
examined by making three adjustments.  
 
Firstly, the robustness of these results is examined using Weighted Least Squares (WLS) 
instead of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). WLS is preferred over OLS for two reasons. 
Firstly, the criticism of Loughran and Ritter (2000)’s of the CTP approach is considered. 
According to Loughran and Ritter (2000), the CTP has low power to detect abnormal 
performance since it weights each time period equally. Any differential abnormal 
performance in periods of high activity versus periods of low activity will be averaged out 
by the regression approach making the CTP approach less likely to uncover abnormal 
performance (Loughran & Ritter, 2000). The WLS procedure allows months with more 
acquiring firms to be weighted more heavily. Secondly, the WLS deals with potential 
heteroscedastic residuals induced by the changing portfolio composition, since variance 
is related to the number of firms in the portfolio. The weights used for the WLS are 
proportional to the square root of the number of firms present in each calendar time 
portfolio month. Despite this adjustment, the post-acquisition abnormal returns remain 
insignificant and largely the same as before with one-year, two-year and three-year post-
acquisitions abnormal returns of -0.0006 (p-value=0.8010), 0.0001 (p-value=0.9535) and 
0.0011 (p-value=0.6172), per month respectively.  
 
The second adjustment made for more robust results is constructing value-weighted 
portfolios instead of equal-weighted portfolios. In each monthly portfolio, each company 
is weighted using by its size, as measured by market capitalization. Value-weighted 
returns for the size and book-to-value factors are also used in the normal return model. 
Adjusting for size results in one-year, two-year and three-year post-acquisitions abnormal 
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returns of -0.0013 (p-value=0.5771), -0.0006 (p-value=0.8026) and 0.0005 (p-
value=0.8352). As before, the returns remained largely unchanged with regard to their 
magnitude and statistical significance. The WLS results from the equal and value-
weighted sample are presented in Panels A and B of Table 4.  
 
The third adjustment made is the consideration of non-overlapping M&As. To get better 
insight into any possible cross-sectional dependence in the results that may arise due to 
overlapping acquisition events by the same firm, and in-line with studies by Dutta and Jog 
(2009) and Andre, Kooli and L’Her (2004), non-overlapping events are examined. As with 
BHARs, any acquisition that occurred within three years of a previously included 
acquisition by the same firm is excluded from our sample. The WLS one-year, two-year 
and three-year value-weighted non overlapping abnormal returns are 0.0088 (p-
value=0.0226), -0.0018 (p-value=0.3824) and -0.0003 (p-value=0.8627), per month 
respectively. Similar to the overlapping sample, the one-year, two-year and three-year 
equal-weighted WLS abnormal returns of 0.0031 (p-value=0.236), -0.0011 (p-
value=0.6186) and 0.0005 (p-value=0.7779) are insignificant. The WLS results from the 
equal and value-weighted non-overlapping sample are presented in Panels A and B of 
Table 5.  
 
Table 4. CTP WLS results from the overlapping sample 
Panel A. WLS results from the equal-weighted overlapping sample 
Holding period 
(months) 
 
12 
 
 
24 
 
 
36 
 
 
Alpha 
 
 
-0.0006 
(0.801) 
 
0.0001 
(0.9535) 
 
0.0011 
(0.6172) 
Findi 
 
 
0.5086 *** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5030 *** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5175 *** 
(0.0000) 
Size (SMB) 
 
 
0.3816 *** 
(0.0022) 
 
0.492 *** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5140 *** 
(0.0000) 
Value (HML) 
 
 
-0.1195 
(0.1506) 
 
-0.0078 
(0.9113) 
 
0.1154 * 
(0.0971) 
Resi 
 
 
0.2369 *** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.2538 *** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.2325 *** 
(0.0000) 
 
R2 
 
 
0.6426 
 
 
0.6481 
 
 
0.6240 
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Panel B. Results from the value-weighted overlapping sample 
Holding period 
(months) 
 
12 
 
 
24 
 
 
36 
Alpha 
 
 
-0.0013 
(0.5771) 
 
-0.0006 
(0.8206) 
 
0.0005 
(0.8352) 
Findi 
 
 
0.5467 *** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5167 *** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5707 *** 
(0.0000) 
Size (SMB) 
 
 
0.1812 ** 
(0.0393) 
 
0.2728 *** 
(0.0013) 
 
0.3073 *** 
(0.0003) 
Value (HML) 
 
 
-0.0979 
(0.1652) 
 
0.0126 
(0.8428) 
 
0.1166 * 
(0.0707) 
Resi 
 
 
0.2192 *** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.2665 *** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.2678 *** 
(0.0000) 
 
R2 
 
 
0.645 
 
 
0.6279 
 
 
0.5926 
 
A combination of four factors that have been deemed suitable for the South Africa equity market are used to determine 
abnormal returns. Findi and Resi refer to the Financial-Industrial and Resources indices respectively. SMB is the 
difference between the returns of small size firm portfolios and large size firm portfolios while HML is the difference 
between the returns of value firm portfolios and growth firm portfolios. The Alpha value reported in the regression model 
indicates the monthly average abnormal return of the sample and is expressed as a decimal and not a percentage. The 
weighted least squares (WLS) technique is used in which the square root of the number of firms in each month is used 
as its weight in regression model. Both equal and value-weighted WLS returns are calculated. The number of cases 
with complete return data for up to three years, used in the analysis to calculate alpha, are 204. Value-weighted returns 
are calculated using size, as measured by market cap. T-Statistics and significance levels are reported for each factor. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 5. CTP WLS results from the non-overlapping sample 
Panel A. WLS results from the equal-weighted non overlapping sample 
Holding period 
(months) 
 
12 
 
 
24 
 
 
36 
Alpha 
 
 
0.0031 
(0.2360) 
 
-0.0011 
(0.6186) 
 
0.0005 
(0.7779) 
 
Findi 
 
 
0.5685 *** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5973 *** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.6291 *** 
(0.0000) 
Size (SMB) 
 
 
0.3241 ** 
(0.0189) 
 
0.4565 *** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.4173 *** 
(0.0000) 
Value (HML) 
 
 
0.0657 
(0.4717) 
 
0.0109 
(1.4421) 
 
0.1077 * 
(0.0751) 
Resi 
 
 
0.1527 *** 
(0.0001) 
 
0.1953 *** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.1598 *** 
(0.0000) 
 
R2 
 
 
0.5671 
 
 
0.6608 
 
 
0.6771 
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Panel B. WLS results from the value-weighted non overlapping sample.  
Holding period 
(months) 
 
12 
 
 
24 
 
 
36 
Alpha 
 
 
0.0088 ** 
(0.0226) 
 
-0.0018 
(0.3824) 
 
-0.0003 
(0.8627) 
Findi 
 
 
0.5375 *** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.6564 *** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.6807 *** 
(0.0000) 
Size (SMB) 
 
 
-0.0914 
(0.5211) 
 
0.4203 *** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.4547 *** 
(0.0000) 
Value (HML) 
 
 
0.0868 
(0.4484) 
 
0.0337 
(0.5267) 
 
0.1041 ** 
(0.0448) 
Resi 
 
 
0.1434 ** 
(0.0361) 
 
0.2391 *** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.2236 *** 
(0.0000) 
R2 
 
 
0.3404 
 
 
0.6761 
 
 
0.7029 
 
 
A combination of four factors that have been deemed suitable for the South Africa equity market are used to determine 
abnormal returns. Findi and Resi refer to the Financial-Industrial and Resources indices respectively. SMB is the 
difference between the returns of small size firm portfolios and large size firm portfolios while HML is the difference 
between the returns of value firm portfolios and growth firm portfolios. The Alpha value reported in the regression model 
indicates the monthly average abnormal return of the sample and is expressed as a decimal and not as a percentage. 
The weighted least squares (WLS) technique is used in which the square root of the number of firms in each month is 
used as its weight in regression model. If a firm makes acquisitions within three years of a previous acquisition, the 
cases were considered overlapping otherwise, events are considered non-overlapping cases. The number of cases 
with complete return data for up to three years, used in the analysis to calculate alpha, are 121. Both equal and value-
weighted WLS returns are calculated. Value-weighted returns are calculated using size, as measured by market 
capitalisation. T-Statistics and significance levels are reported for each factor. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Lastly, considering the findings from the BHAR approach, returns to resource and 
financial and industrial acquirers are investigated separately. Specifically, non-
overlapping value-weighted WLS returns are estimated for both groups of acquirers. An 
adjustment is also made to the normal return model: for resource firms, a three-factor 
model of the Resi, size and book-to-market variables is utilized while the Findi, size and 
book-to-market is utilized for financial and industrial acquirers This adjustment is made 
since, according to van Rensburg (2002), individual firm returns are influenced by either 
the Findi or the Resi, but seldom by both.  
 
For financial and industrial acquirers, one-year, two-year and three-year, abnormal 
returns are 0.0043 (p-value = 0.1881), 0.0041 (p-value = 0.0991) and 0.0034 (p-value = 
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0.292), per month respectively. Interestingly, the magnitude and significance of the 
abnormal returns to resource acquirers from the BHAR approach diminish with the CTP 
approach. Monthly one-year, two-year and three-year, abnormal returns are -0.0065 (p-
value = 0.4268), -0.0099 (p-value = 0.1692) and -0.0072 (p-value = 0.2254), respectively. 
The diminishing of the magnitude and significance of the BHARs is possibly due to the 
correction of cross-correlation in returns of resource stocks by the CTP approach. The 
results are presented in Table 6. 
  
From the CTP regressions, the coefficients for the Findi and the Resi are positive and 
significant at the 1% level for all our CTP regressions, except for the one-year value-
weighted non overlapping sample where the Resi was significant at the 5% level. This 
justifies their inclusion in the model and overall significance in predicting returns in the 
South African equity market. The coefficient of the size (SMB) variable is positive and 
significant at least the 5% level in fourteen of the eighteen regressions in the study. This 
implies, rather surprisingly, that the average size of acquiring firms is small.  
 
Table 6. CTP results from the Financial & Industrial and Resource groups. 
Panel A. WLS results from the value-weighted non overlapping Financial & Industrial group 
Holding period 
(months) 
 
12 
 
 
24 
 
 
36 
Alpha 
 
 
0.0043 
(0.1881) 
 
0.0041 
(0.0991) 
 
0.0034 
(0.2920) 
 
Findi 
 
 
0.9230 *** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.9563 *** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.7892 *** 
(0.0000) 
Size (SMB) 
 
 
0.1929 * 
(0.0771) 
 
0.0557 
(0.5409) 
 
-0.3056 *** 
(0.0057) 
Value (HML) 
 
 
0.1493 * 
(0.0898) 
 
0.1605 ** 
(0.0142) 
 
-0.0787 
(0.3570) 
R2 
 
 
0.5213 
 
 
0.6451 
 
 
0.5069 
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Panel B. WLS results from the value-weighted non-overlapping Resources group 
Holding period 
(months) 
 
12 
 
 
24 
 
 
36 
Alpha 
 
 
-0.0065  
(0.4268) 
 
-0.0099 
(0.1682) 
 
-0.0072 
(0.2254) 
Resi 
 
 
0.8399 *** 
(0.0000) 
 
1.0987 *** 
(0.0000) 
 
1.2235 *** 
(0.0000) 
Size (SMB) 
 
 
-0.2742 
(0.3654) 
 
-0.1653 *** 
(0.5590) 
 
-0.04277  
(0.8596) 
Value (HML) 
 
 
0.0752 
(0.8080) 
 
0.3773 
(0.1478) 
 
0.7515 *** 
(0.0006) 
R2 
 
 
0.4428 
 
 
0.4822 
 
 
0.5607 
 
 
 
A combination of four factors that have been deemed suitable for the South Africa equity market are used to determine 
abnormal returns. Findi and Resi refer to the Financial-Industrial and Resources indices respectively. SMB is the 
difference between the returns of small size firm portfolios and large size firm portfolios, while HML is the difference 
between the returns of value firm portfolios and growth firm portfolios. For the financial and industrial firms, the Findi, 
size and value factors are used, while for resource stocks, the Resi, size and value factors are used. The Alpha value 
reported in the regression model indicates the monthly average abnormal return of the sample and is expressed as a 
decimal not percentage. The weighted least squares (WLS) technique is used in which the square root of the number 
of firms in each month is used as its weight in regression model. If a firm makes acquisitions within three years of a 
previous acquisition, the cases were considered overlapping otherwise, events are considered non-overlapping cases. 
The number of cases, with complete return data for up to three years, used in the analysis to calculate alpha are 121. 
Only value-weighted returns are calculated using size, as measured by market capitalisation. T-Statistics and 
significance levels are reported for each factor. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
The coefficient of the value (HML) variable is significantly positive in seven of the eighteen 
regressions, suggesting that most South African acquirers are value acquirers with higher 
book-to-market values. 
 
Overall, when the equal-weighted results and the more robust value-weighted results for 
both the overlapping and non-overlapping samples are considered, the study finds no 
long-term significant alpha or abnormal return. These results are consistent with the short-
term positive abnormal return that became insignificant within ten days after 
announcement dates of M&A. The study therefore concludes that there is no long-run 
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underperformance of South African acquirers. Next, the effect of various deal-specific 
factors on long-run abnormal returns to South African acquirers is examined.  
 
5.4. Determinants of long-run performance 
In assessing the correlation of various deal-specific characteristics with the long-run 
abnormal share return performance of South African acquirers, the WLS value-weighted 
three-year alpha from the CTP non-overlapping sample is preferred. The following 
characteristics are examined: the method of payment, the listing status of targets, the 
target’s geographical location, the relatedness of the target’s industry to the acquirer’s, 
and the percentage of the target acquired. Table 6 presents alphas from the determinants 
of long-run M&A performance in South Africa.  
 
The method of payment hypothesis of Myers and Majluf (1984) states that firms pay with 
equity when their stock is overvalued but pay with cash when their stock is undervalued. 
When this hypothesis is investigated, the study finds, as expected and in line with similar 
studies by Andre, Kooli and L’Her (2004) and Mager and Meyer-Fackler (2017) that cash 
acquirers outperform equity acquirers. Cash acquirers have a slight positive monthly 
alpha of 0.0146 (p-value = 0.0009) while equity acquirers have a smaller and (even at 
10%) insignificant monthly alpha of 0.0065 (p-value = 0.223), over a three-year holding 
period. Although slightly better than equity acquirers, acquirers who use a combination of 
cash and equity also have a small and at 10% significance level a statistically non-
significant monthly alpha of 0.0138 (p-value = 0.1476) over three years. 
 
The study found that acquirers of private targets slightly outperform their counterparts 
who acquire public targets. Monthly alpha for acquirers of private targets over a three-
year holding period was 0.0143 (p-value = 0.0021) while acquirers of public targets 
generated an alpha of 0.0101 (p-value = 0.0478). Acquirers of subsidiaries had the 
highest and most significant return, with an alpha of 0.017 (p-value = 0). As expected, the 
returns to acquirers of private firms are higher return as they purchase assets at a 
discount since their targets trade in relatively illiquid markets compared to private firms.  
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 Table 7. Abnormal returns to the determinants of long-run M&A performance.  
Variables 
Mode of payment: 
Equity 
Cash 
Cash and Equity 
 
Target’s listing status: 
Public 
Private 
Subsidiary 
 
Country of transaction: 
Cross border 
Non cross border 
 
Industry relatedness: 
Related activity 
Non- related activity 
 
Percentage acquired: 
50% or more 
Less than 50% 
Alpha over three years 
 
 0.0065 
 0.0146 
 0.0138 
 
  
 0.0101 
 0.0143 
 0.0170 
 
  
 0.0049 
 0.0024 
 
  
 0.0041 
 0.0036 
 
 
 0.0146 
 0.0141 
P-value 
 
 0.2230 
 0.0009 *** 
 0.1476  
  
  
 0.3705 
 0.0021 *** 
 0.0000 *** 
 
  
 0.0915 * 
 0.3532 
 
  
 0.2096 
 0.1805 * 
 
 
0.0009 *** 
0.0049 *** 
R2 
 
 0.0593 
 0.0547 
 0.1062 
 
  
 0.0490 
 0.0485 
 0.0448 
 
  
 0.5985 
 0.5801 
 
  
 0.4433 
 0.5996 
 
 
0.0547 
0.0314 
 
A combination of four factors that have been deemed suitable for the South Africa equity market are used to determine 
abnormal returns, i.e. the Findi, the Resi, size and book-to-market factors. The Alpha value reported in the regression 
model indicates the monthly average abnormal return of the sample and is expressed as a decimal, and not as a 
percentage. The weighted least squares (WLS) technique is used in which the square root of the number of firms in 
each month is used as its weight in regression model. If a firm makes acquisitions within three years of a previous 
acquisition, the cases were considered overlapping. Only non-overlapping case are considered. The number of non-
overlapping cases, with complete return data for up to three years, used in the analysis to calculate alpha are 121. Only 
value-weighted WLS returns are calculated. Value-weighted returns are calculated using size, as measured by market 
capitalisation. T-Statistics and significance levels are reported for each factor. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
. 
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Interestingly, the study also finds support for the internalization theory of Francoeur 
(2007). The internalization theory states that cross-border M&A may help create value for 
acquiring firms if such firms tap into their expertise and know-how on international 
markets. This study finds that South African cross border acquirers, with a positive and 
significant monthly alpha of 0.0049 (p-value = 0.0915) outperform non-cross border 
acquirers who earn a positive but statistically not significant monthly alpha of 0.0024 (p-
value = 0.3532). While these results directly contradict those of Andre, Kooli and L’Her 
(2004), they are in-line with the findings of Mager & Meyer-Fackler (2017).   
 
Next, the impact of industry relatedness on long-term share returns to South African 
acquirers was investigated. According to Andre, Kooli and L’Her (2004), numerous 
researchers report that conglomerate mergers underperform horizontal or related 
mergers because managers are not familiar with the target industry. Furthermore, 
horizontal mergers should benefit from synergies such as economies of scale and a 
stronger market share. This study finds evidence for these suggestions, as South African 
conglomerate mergers earned a lower monthly alpha of 0.0036 (p-value=0.1805) and 
underperformed horizontal mergers, which also earned a positive but statistically not 
significant monthly alpha of 0.0041 (0.2096).  
 
Lastly, the study examines the difference in returns, if any, to acquirers of 50% or more, 
versus those who acquire less than 50% of their targets. The study finds this important 
as an acquisition of 50% of more of targets gives acquirers control. Acquirers of 50% or 
more of their targets earn a slightly higher alpha of 0.0146 (p-value = 0.0009) than their 
counterparts who acquire less than 50%, and earn an alpha of 0.0141 (p-value = 0.0049). 
This suggests that perhaps gaining control in M&A transactions may not necessarily yield 
a higher premium for South African acquirers. In the next chapter, the study is concluded 
with a discussion of the results and the implications these results have for South African 
firms considering M&A as a corporate strategy.  
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Chapter 6: Analysis and Conclusion  
This study examined the long-run performance of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) in 
South Africa. This has required not only an empirical evaluation of long-run performance 
of M&A, but also an investigation into various deal characteristics that play a role in 
determining long-run M&A performance. The study also briefly investigated the short-run 
performance of M&A. This chapter follows the same three broad categories as have been 
used throughout this paper: 1) short-run performance; 2) long-run performance; and 3) 
possible determinants of long-run performance. 
 
Although this study focuses on the long-run performance of M&A in South Africa, the 
short-run performance is briefly considered. As the short-run performance is an indicator 
of investors’ expectations of M&A deals, it is relevant to determine whether these 
expectations manifest in the long-run. The study uses the standard-event study 
methodology of Fama et al. (1969) to calculate Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
(CAARs) around M&A announcement dates. In determining a suitable benchmark for the 
abnormal returns, attention is paid to the dichotomy in the return generating process 
between resource stocks and non-resource stocks on the JSE. Consequently, the two-
factor APT of van Rensburg (2002), which comprises of the JSE’s Financial-Industrial 
(Findi) and Resources (Resi) indices, was used as a benchmark for expected returns. 
The study found significant positive abnormal share return performance in the (-5, 5) 
event window. However, the market corrects for this initial positive reaction to M&A 
announcements as the CAARs become insignificant within 10 days of the announcement. 
The robustness of these findings is corroborated using the constant mean return model 
as a proxy for expected returns. Using the constant mean return model as a benchmark 
for abnormal returns did not change the conclusions reached with the two-factor APT.  
 
Regarding the long-run performance of M&A and other corporate actions such as share 
buy backs and Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), two issues have drawn considerable 
interest: the methodologies used to estimate abnormal returns and the appropriate 
benchmarks for normal or expected returns. Although initial studies on corporate actions 
used the CAAR approach of Fama et al (1969), the Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return 
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(BHAR) and the Calendar Time Portfolio (CTP) approaches have been preferred in more 
recent studies. This study employs both approaches, although the results from the CTP 
approach are preferred as it is considered more statistically robust.  
 
Beginning with the BHAR approach, abnormal return is estimated as the difference 
between the long-run compounded buy-and-hold return of a sample firm less the long-
run compounded return of an appropriate benchmark. Barber and Lyon (1997) suggest 
that the appropriate benchmark for the BHAR approach is the control firm approach, 
which matches sample firms to control firms of similar size and book-to-market value. 
However, given the relatively small size of the JSE, this approach was found to be 
inappropriate for the study The authors take a similar approach to that employed by Mager 
and Meyer-Fackler (2017), who run into a similar problem, and match each individual firm 
to its respective JSE industry index.  
 
Initial returns from the BHAR approach are significantly negative, at least at the 10% level. 
The direction, magnitude and significance of these results persists even when value-
weighted returns are calculated instead of equal-weighted returns. However, according 
to Mitchell and Stafford (2000), due to positive cross-correlation in returns, the BHAR 
approach provides overstated test statistics which in turn provide false evidence of 
abnormal returns. As such, two robustness checks are applied to correct for any cross-
correlation. Firstly, the study uses the test statistic proposed by Kolari and Pynnönen 
(2010) that corrects for cross-correlation. Secondly, only non-overlapping cases are 
considered. Any acquisition that occurred within three years of a previously included 
acquisition by the same firm is excluded from the sample. The significance of the initial 
returns disappears after these adjustments. 
 
Due to the dichotomy in the return generating process between resource stocks and non-
resource stocks on the JSE, the non-overlapping sample of each group is investigated 
separately using value-weighted returns and the Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) test statistic 
that corrects for cross-correlation. Interestingly, while Financial and Industrial stocks (non-
resource stocks) had insignificant returns, resource stocks had negative and significant 
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returns. The results from the BHAR approach are corroborated with the more robust CTP 
approach, which adjusts for positive cross-correlation in results.  
 
Under the CTP approach, a portfolio is constructed each calendar month. This portfolio 
comprises of all firms that experienced M&A during the particular month. Monthly 
portfolios are constructed over the entire sample period (2003-2014) and are rebalanced 
monthly to drop all companies that reach the end of their holding period (one-year, two-
year and three-year holding periods are considered for the CTP approach) and add all 
companies that have just undergone an M&A. The resulting time series of monthly returns 
from the portfolio is regressed on the normal return model comprising of a combination of 
factors deemed appropriate for the South African equity market to determine abnormal 
returns. These factors are the Findi, the Resi, size and value.  
 
Initial results from the CTP approach indicate positive but non-significant abnormal 
returns. However, similar to the BHAR approach, three adjustments are made for 
robustness. Firstly, for the CTP regression, Weighted Least Squares (WLS) are preferred 
to Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to weight each calendar month with the number of firms 
in its portfolio. Secondly, value-weighted returns are preferred to equal-weighted returns 
and thirdly, only non-overlapping cases are considered to correct for any cross-correlation 
in returns. These adjustments result in negative but insignificant abnormal returns. 
Furthermore, the returns to Financial and Industrial stocks (non-resource stocks) and 
resource stocks are investigated separately. Interestingly, the magnitude and significance 
of the abnormal returns to resource acquirers seen under the BHAR approach diminishes 
with the CTP approach. Returns to the Financial and Industrial stocks remain insignificant 
as with the BHAR approach.  
 
Lastly, the study examined the potential deal characteristics that could play a role in 
explain the long-run performance of South African acquirers. Deal characteristics were 
examined using the CTP approach and the value-weighted three-year alpha (abnormal 
return) from non-overlapping sample. Five characteristics are examined; the method of 
payment, the listing status of targets, the target’s nation, the relatedness of the target’s 
67 
 
industry to the acquirer’s and the percentage of the target acquired. Findings from the 
study substantiate initial theories on the impact of different deal characteristics on long-
run M&A performance.   
 
The study finds that cash acquirers outperform equity acquirers and therefore further 
substantiates the method of payment hypothesis of Myers and Majluf (1984), which states 
that firms pay with equity when their stock is overvalued but pay with cash when their 
stock is undervalued. With regards to returns to acquiring private versus public targets, 
returns to acquirers of private firms are higher return than those of public targets. This 
could be explained by the illiquidity discount of purchasing firms in relatively illiquid private 
markets compared to public markets. There is also evidence for the internalization theory 
of Francoeur (2007). According to the internalization theory, cross-border M&A may help 
create value for acquiring firms if such firms tap into their expertise and know how on 
international markets. The study thus finds that cross-border acquirers outperform non 
cross-border acquirers. With respect to industry relatedness, according to Andre, Kooli 
and L’Her (2004), numerous researchers suggest that conglomerate mergers 
underperform horizontal or related mergers because managers are not familiar with the 
target industry and the synergies in horizontal mergers. The study finds support for this 
hypothesis as conglomerate mergers underperformed horizontal mergers. Lastly, the 
significance of acquiring control in M&A was investigated. The study found M&A that 
resulted in gaining control slightly outperformed those in which control was not gained.  
 
This study was motivated by the paradox posed by Brouthers, van Hastenburg and van 
den Ven (1998): If the empirical evidence suggests that M&A fail in the long-run, why do 
they remain a popular expansion strategy for companies? While South African firms are 
increasingly making use of M&A as a corporate strategy, it was unclear whether M&A 
created any value for shareholders. Overall, using the most robust methodologies and 
normal return benchmarks suitable for the South African equity market, the study does 
not find any significant abnormal return to South African M&A indicating that M&A do not 
deliver any statistically significant short- or long-term value to shareholders. This implies 
that South African firms using M&A should do so with caution.  
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Appendix A: Full overlapping event list 
Date 
Effective 
Acquirer Name Target Name 
1/22/2003 Santam Ltd Westminster Motor Insurance Association 
Ltd 
5/5/2003 Harmony Gold Mining Co Ltd Abelle Ltd 
5/6/2003 Harmony Gold Mining Co Ltd Abelle Ltd 
9/22/2003 Harmony Gold Mining Co Ltd African Rainbow Minerals Gold Ltd 
4/26/2004 Anglogold Ltd Ashanti Goldfields Co Ltd 
8/18/2003 Growthpoint Properties Ltd Primegro Properties Ltd 
1/1/2004 Mvelaphanda Resources Ltd Gold Fields Ltd 
9/12/2003 Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd Zimbabwe Platinum Mines Ltd 
7/31/2003 Harmony Gold Mining Co Ltd Avgold Ltd 
9/30/2003 Ellerine Holdings Ltd Wetherlys Investment Holdings Ltd 
12/17/2003 AECI Ltd Chemical Services Ltd {Chemserve} 
10/9/2003 Nedbank Ltd SND Investments Holdings Ltd 
12/12/2003 Edgars Consolidated Stores 
Ltd 
Boardmans 
5/11/2004 Harmony Gold Mining Co Ltd Avgold Ltd 
5/11/2004 Harmony Gold Mining Co Ltd Avgold Ltd 
3/31/2004 Barloworld Ltd Avis Southern Africa Ltd 
12/5/2003 Brimstone Investment Corp 
Ltd 
Sea Harvest Corp (Pty) Ltd 
3/31/2004 Kagiso Media Ltd Jacaranda FM(Pty)Ltd 
8/6/2004 The Bidvest Group Ltd BIDvest PLC 
7/13/2004 Aspen Pharmacare Holdings 
Ltd 
Fine Chemicals Corp(Pty)Ltd 
6/18/2004 Harmony Gold Mining Co Ltd Abelle Ltd 
8/2/2004 The Bidvest Group Ltd BIDCorp Plc 
7/2/2004 AngloGold Ashanti Ltd Trans-Siberian Gold PLC 
6/1/2005 AngloGold Ashanti Ltd Trans-Siberian Gold PLC 
11/11/2004 Murray & Roberts Holdings Ltd Clough Ltd 
8/31/2004 Allied Technologies Ltd Econet Wireless Group 
10/6/2004 Johnnies Industrial Corp Ltd Fabcos Investment Holdings Co Ltd 
5/10/2005 Liberty Group Ltd Capital Alliance Holdings Ltd 
12/2/2004 Growthpoint Properties Ltd Paddocks Shopping Centre 
2/1/2005 Growthpoint Properties Ltd Tresso Trading 199 Pty Ltd- Property 
Portfolio 
4/1/2005 Super Group Ltd SMB Fleet Management Pty Ltd 
9/9/2005 Hyprop Investments Ltd S A Retail Properties Ltd 
9/13/2005 The Bidvest Group Ltd Deli XL BV 
12/8/2005 Sanlam Ltd African Life Assurance Co Ltd {Aflife} 
11/11/2005 Murray & Roberts Holdings Ltd Clough Ltd 
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11/11/2005 Murray & Roberts Holdings Ltd Clough Ltd 
11/30/2005 Barloworld Ltd Avis Biludlejning 
3/2/2006 Gold Fields Ltd Bolivar Gold Corp 
1/3/2006 Absa Group Ltd Barclays National Bank-South Africa 
7/20/2006 Barloworld Ltd Wattyl Ltd 
2/16/2006 Imperial Holdings Ltd Lex Commercials Ltd 
2/20/2006 Gold Fields Ltd Sino Gold Ltd 
9/19/2006 Sun International Ltd Real Africa Holdings Ltd 
8/1/2006 Tiger Brands Ltd Bromor Foods(Pty)Ltd 
5/1/2006 MTN Group Ltd MTN Cote D'Ivoire SA 
9/14/2006 MTN Group Ltd Investcom LLC 
5/6/2006 Naspers LTD Abril SA 
7/6/2006 MTN Group Ltd MTN Uganda Ltd 
8/23/2006 Caxton & CTP Publishers & 
Printers Ltd 
Johnnic Communications Ltd 
9/4/2006 Cadiz Holdings Ltd African Harvest Fund Managers (Pty)Ltd 
8/28/2006 Esor Ltd Franki South Africa(Pty)Ltd 
9/6/2006 Metorex Ltd Barberton Mines Ltd 
12/1/2006 Gold Fields Ltd Barrick Gold South Africa(Pty) Ltd 
4/10/2007 Gold Fields Ltd Western Areas Ltd 
6/26/2007 AngloGold Ashanti Ltd OOO GRK Amikan 
10/1/2006 Gijima AST Group AST Distribution Technology (Pty)Ltd 
10/18/2006 MTN Group Ltd MTN Nigeria Communications Ltd 
4/26/2007 Aquarius Platinum Ltd Aquarius Platinum (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd 
2/20/2007 Group Five Ltd Quarry Cats 
12/4/2006 Datatec Ltd CSF Solutions Ltd 
4/19/2007 SA Corporate Real Estate 
Fund 
S A Retail Properties Ltd 
1/23/2007 Naspers LTD Mail.Ru 
2/7/2007 Afrimat Ltd Malans Quarries(Pty)Ltd 
2/23/2007 Telkom SA Ltd Africa Online Inc 
5/14/2007 Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd African Platinum PLC 
10/1/2008 Exxaro Resources Ltd Namakwa Sands(Pty)Ltd 
3/22/2007 Telkom SA Ltd Multi-Links Telecommunications Ltd 
3/27/2007 Emira Property Fund Ltd Freestone Property Holdings Ltd 
7/16/2007 York Timber Organisation Ltd Global Forest Products(Pty)Ltd 
5/3/2007 Datatec Ltd Crane Telecommunications Group Ltd 
4/26/2007 Aquarius Platinum Ltd Aquarius Platinum (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd 
5/8/2007 The Bidvest Group Ltd Angliss Singapore Pte Ltd 
7/9/2007 Group Five Ltd Sky Sands (Pty) Ltd 
9/1/2007 AngloGold Ashanti Ltd Iduapriem Mines 
12/1/2007 Naspers LTD Gadu-Gadu SA 
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1/30/2008 Vox Telecom Ltd Storm Telecom 
3/6/2008 Aspen Pharmacare Holdings 
Ltd 
Strides Latina 
11/21/2007 Purple Capital Ltd Global Trader Ltd 
12/31/2007 Aspen Pharmacare Holdings 
Ltd 
Onco Therapies Ltd 
1/28/2008 Metorex Ltd Copper Resources Corp 
12/7/2007 Metorex Ltd Phoenix Platinum Mining Ltd 
7/1/2008 AngloGold Ashanti Ltd Golden Cycle Gold Corp 
1/29/2008 Hudaco Industries Ltd Astore Africa (Pty)Ltd 
6/4/2008 Aquarius Platinum Ltd Platinum Mile Resources (Pty) Ltd 
5/30/2008 Sanlam Ltd Principal Investment Holdings Ltd 
3/26/2008 Liberty Group Ltd Fountainhead Property Trust 
4/10/2008 Sanlam Ltd Buckles Investment Services Ltd 
4/30/2008 Metorex Ltd Copper Resources Corp 
5/22/2008 Gold Fields Ltd Sino Gold Mining Ltd 
7/18/2008 Standard Bank Group Ltd Liberty Holdings Ltd 
12/15/2008 AngloGold Ashanti Ltd Sao Bento Gold Ltd 
12/1/2008 O-Line Holdings Ltd Armco 
9/22/2008 Esor Ltd Patula Construction (Pty)Ltd 
9/22/2008 Afrocentric Investment Corp 
Ltd 
Lethimvula Investments Ltd 
12/31/2008 Sappi Ltd M-real Corp-Coated Graphic Paper 
Business 
9/30/2008 Remgro Ltd PG Group 
3/24/2009 African Rainbow Minerals Ltd TEAL Exploration & Mining Inc 
1/21/2009 Telkom SA Ltd Multi-Links Telecommunications Ltd 
1/29/2009 Absa Group Ltd Pinnacle Point Holdings (Pty) Ltd 
1/29/2009 Absa Group Ltd Blue Financial Services Ltd 
7/30/2009 Aquarius Platinum Ltd Ridge Mining PLC 
3/17/2009 Simmer & Jack Mines Ltd AngloGold Ashanti Ltd-Tau Lekoa Mine 
3/2/2009 Distell Group Ltd Pernod Ricard SA-Bisquit Cognac Brand 
10/7/2009 Standard Bank Group Ltd Investitsionnaya Kompaniya Troyka Dialog 
ZAO 
8/5/2009 Growthpoint Properties Ltd Orchard Industrial Property Fund 
4/16/2010 Nedbank Group Ltd Imperial Bank Ltd 
11/2/2009 Remgro Ltd VenFin Ltd 
10/15/2009 AngloGold Ashanti Ltd Moto Goldmines Ltd 
9/29/2009 The Bidvest Group Ltd NOWACO Czech Republic sro 
10/1/2009 Allied Technologies Ltd Kenya Data Networks Ltd 
9/28/2009 Naspers LTD BuscaPe.com Inc 
10/1/2009 Datatec Ltd Datastor(NZ)Ltd 
7/1/2010 Grand Parade Investments Ltd Tatts Group Ltd-Gaming Operations 
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4/14/2010 Adcock Ingram Holdings Ltd Ayrton Drug Manufacturing Ltd 
12/3/2009 Standard Bank Group Ltd Casa do Pao de Queijo Ltda 
1/15/2010 Datatec Ltd NetStar Group Holding Ltd 
4/19/2010 SA Corporate Real Estate 
Fund 
Old Mutual Triangle Warehouse 
3/30/2010 Sycom Property Fund Tyger Hills Office Park (Pty) Ltd 
3/1/2010 Santova Logistics Ltd Aviocean(Pty)Ltd 
8/27/2010 Redefine Properties Ltd Hyprop Investments Ltd 
1/31/2011 Aspen Pharmacare Holdings 
Ltd 
Sigma Pharmaceuticals Ltd- Pharmaceutical 
Division 
5/13/2011 Hospitality Property Fund Ltd Arabella South Africa Holdings (Pty)Ltd-
Hotels (2) 
1/3/2011 FirstRand Ltd Barnard Jacobs Mellet Holdings Ltd 
8/31/2013 Hudaco Industries Ltd Filter & Hose Solutions (Pty) Ltd 
9/1/2010 Santam Ltd Indwe Broker Holdings Group Ltd 
11/30/2010 Imperial Holdings Ltd CIC Holdings Ltd 
9/8/2010 Business Connexion Group 
Ltd 
Business Connexion(Pty)Ltd 
10/7/2010 Datatec Ltd Westcon Group Inc 
11/30/2013 Hudaco Industries Ltd Global Communications Network 
3/28/2011 Capital Property Fund Ltd Pangbourne Properties Ltd 
9/1/2011 Hyprop Investments Ltd Attfund Retail Ltd 
5/11/2011 Business Connexion Group 
Ltd 
UCS Solutions Holdings (Pty)Ltd ,CEB 
Maintenance Africa(Pty),L 
3/1/2011 Sasol Ltd Talisman Energy Inc-Farrell Creek Shale 
Gas Assets 
12/22/2010 The Bidvest Group Ltd Seafood Holdings Ltd 
10/2/2012 Sanlam Ltd Shriram Capital Ltd 
3/18/2011 Steinhoff International 
Holdings Ltd 
Conforama SA 
1/6/2012 Keaton Energy Holdings Ltd Leeuw Mining & Exploration (Pty) Ltd 
5/31/2011 Tiger Brands Ltd Davita Trading (Pty)Ltd 
6/10/2011 Sasol Ltd Talisman Energy Inc-Cypress A 
Assets,British Columbia 
6/22/2011 Gold Fields Ltd Gold Fields Ltd-Tarkwa & Damang Gold 
Mines 
6/9/2011 Resilient Property Income 
Fund Ltd 
The Grove, Pretoria 
9/30/2011 AngloGold Ashanti Ltd First Uranium Corp 
12/1/2011 Resilient Property Income 
Fund Ltd 
Boardwalk Shopping Centre 
3/12/2012 Rainbow Chicken Ltd Bush Valley Chickens 
8/8/2012 PBT Group Ltd Prescient Capital (Pty)Ltd 
6/30/2013 ARB Holdings Ltd Eurolux (Pty) Ltd 
10/27/2011 Tiger Brands Ltd National Foods Holdings Ltd 
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3/14/2012 Sun International Ltd Real Africa Holdings Ltd 
3/15/2012 Afrimat Ltd Clinker Supplies (Pty)Ltd 
1/30/2012 Steinhoff International 
Holdings Ltd 
PSG Group Ltd 
4/20/2012 Steinhoff International 
Holdings Ltd 
JD Group Ltd 
2/3/2014 Anglo American Platinum Ltd Atlatsa Resources Corp- Boikgantsho 
Project,Ga-Phasha Project 
3/1/2012 AVI Ltd Green Cross Manufacturers (Pty)Ltd 
8/7/2012 AngloGold Ashanti Ltd First Uranium (Pty)Ltd 
7/25/2012 Redefine Properties Ltd Southcoast Mall 
6/28/2012 AngloGold Ashanti Ltd Gold Mine,Crixas,GO 
6/13/2012 Hudaco Industries Ltd Keys Makin Plastics (Pty)Ltd, Quality 
Compounding (Pty)Ltd 
6/27/2012 AECI Ltd General Electric Co-Chemical & Monitoring 
Solutiions Business 
10/4/2012 Tiger Brands Ltd Dangote Flour Mills Plc 
10/1/2012 Mondi Ltd Nordenia International AG 
7/25/2012 Pretoria Portland Cement Co 
Ltd 
Habesha Cement Share Co 
8/21/2012 Imperial Holdings Ltd RTT Group (Pty)Ltd-RTT Health Services 
11/7/2012 AECI Ltd Black Bear Resources Indonesia PT 
4/29/2013 Rainbow Chicken Ltd Capitau Investment Management Ltd 
7/2/2013 The Bidvest Group Ltd Amalgamated Appliance Holdings Ltd 
{AMAP} 
12/4/2012 Consolidated Infrastructure 
Group Ltd 
AES Angola Environmental Servicos Lda 
4/1/2013 Tiger Brands Ltd Ball's Chutney Pty Ltd 
12/12/2012 PPC Ltd Cimerwa Ltd 
1/25/2013 Adcorp Holdings Ltd Paxus Australia Pty Ltd 
1/24/2013 Netcare Ltd General Healthcare Group PLC 
4/1/2013 Rainbow Chicken Ltd Zam Chick Ltd 
10/1/2013 Hyprop Investments Ltd Somerset Mall 
4/12/2013 Distell Group Ltd Burn Stewart Distillers Ltd 
4/26/2013 Raubex Group Ltd Tosas Holdings (Pty)Ltd 
4/28/2013 Aspen Pharmacare Holdings 
Ltd 
Nestle SA-Infant Nutritional 
Business,Australia 
6/12/2014 Nedbank Group Ltd Banco Unico SA 
10/1/2013 Aspen Pharmacare Holdings 
Ltd 
NV Organon-Active Pharmaceutical 
Ingredients Manufacturing B 
7/1/2013 Delta Property Fund Ltd Atterbury Parkdev Consortium (Pty)Ltd 
12/11/2013 Murray & Roberts Holdings Ltd Clough Ltd 
12/13/2013 PPC Ltd Safika Cement Holdings (Pty)Ltd 
10/17/2013 Resilient Property Income 
Fund Ltd 
Arbour Town (Pty)Ltd 
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10/1/2013 Gold Fields Ltd Barrick Gold Corp-Yilgarn South Assets 
2/7/2014 Keaton Energy Holdings Ltd Xceed Resources Ltd 
10/31/2013 Adcorp Holdings Ltd Labour Solutions Australia 
12/1/2013 Hudaco Industries Ltd Dosco Precision Hydraulics Pty Ltd 
3/1/2014 Growthpoint Properties Ltd Tiber Property Group (Pty)Ltd 
4/30/2014 Vodacom Group Ltd Vodacom Tanzania Ltd 
11/5/2014 Vukile Property Fund Ltd Synergy Income Fund Ltd 
2/28/2014 Naspers LTD Neralona Investments Ltd 
8/31/2014 Redefine Properties Ltd Annuity Properties Ltd 
5/21/2014 Steinhoff International 
Holdings Ltd 
JD Group Ltd 
8/1/2014 Woolworths Holdings Ltd David Jones Ltd 
4/14/2014 Growthpoint Properties Ltd Acucap Properties Ltd 
4/14/2014 Growthpoint Properties Ltd Sycom Property Fund 
9/1/2014 Resilient Property Income 
Fund Ltd 
Jubilee Mall 
9/1/2014 Octodec Investments Ltd Premium Properties Ltd 
12/1/2014 Sun International Ltd San Francisco Investment SA 
8/5/2014 Liberty Holdings Ltd Liberty Health Holdings Pty Ltd 
7/10/2014 The Bidvest Group Ltd DAC Distribuzione Alimentari Convenienze 
SpA 
11/30/2014 Hudaco Industries Ltd Partquip Group (Pty) Ltd 
9/30/2014 Afrocentric Investment Corp 
Ltd 
Pharmacy Direct (Pty) Ltd,Curasana (Pty) 
Ltd 
11/5/2014 PPC Ltd Habesha Cement Share Co 
11/10/2014 Discovery Ltd Prudential Health Ltd 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75 
 
Appendix B: Full non-overlapping event list 
Date 
Effective 
Acquirer Name Target Name 
1/22/2003 Santam Ltd Westminster Motor Insurance Association 
Ltd 
5/5/2003 Harmony Gold Mining Co Ltd Abelle Ltd 
8/18/2003 Growthpoint Properties Ltd Primegro Properties Ltd 
9/12/2003 Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd Zimbabwe Platinum Mines Ltd 
9/30/2003 Ellerine Holdings Ltd Wetherlys Investment Holdings Ltd 
10/9/2003 Nedbank Ltd SND Investments Holdings Ltd 
12/5/2003 Brimstone Investment Corp 
Ltd 
Sea Harvest Corp (Pty) Ltd 
12/12/2003 Edgars Consolidated Stores 
Ltd 
Boardmans 
12/17/2003 AECI Ltd Chemical Services Ltd {Chemserve} 
1/1/2004 Mvelaphanda Resources Ltd Gold Fields Ltd 
3/31/2004 Kagiso Media Ltd Jacaranda FM(Pty)Ltd 
3/31/2004 Barloworld Ltd Avis Southern Africa Ltd 
4/26/2004 Anglogold Ltd Ashanti Goldfields Co Ltd 
7/13/2004 Aspen Pharmacare Holdings 
Ltd 
Fine Chemicals Corp(Pty)Ltd 
8/2/2004 The Bidvest Group Ltd BIDCorp Plc 
8/31/2004 Allied Technologies Ltd Econet Wireless Group 
10/6/2004 Johnnies Industrial Corp Ltd Fabcos Investment Holdings Co Ltd 
11/11/2004 Murray & Roberts Holdings Ltd Clough Ltd 
4/1/2005 Super Group Ltd SMB Fleet Management Pty Ltd 
5/10/2005 Liberty Group Ltd Capital Alliance Holdings Ltd 
9/9/2005 Hyprop Investments Ltd S A Retail Properties Ltd 
12/8/2005 Sanlam Ltd African Life Assurance Co Ltd {Aflife} 
1/3/2006 Absa Group Ltd Barclays National Bank-South Africa 
2/16/2006 Imperial Holdings Ltd Lex Commercials Ltd 
2/20/2006 Gold Fields Ltd Sino Gold Ltd 
5/1/2006 MTN Group Ltd MTN Cote D'Ivoire SA 
5/6/2006 Naspers LTD Abril SA 
8/1/2006 Tiger Brands Ltd Bromor Foods (Pty)Ltd 
8/23/2006 Caxton & CTP Publishers & 
Printers Ltd 
Johnnic Communications Ltd 
8/28/2006 Esor Ltd Franki South Africa (Pty)Ltd 
9/4/2006 Cadiz Holdings Ltd African Harvest Fund Managers (Pty)Ltd 
9/6/2006 Metorex Ltd Barberton Mines Ltd 
9/19/2006 Sun International Ltd Real Africa Holdings Ltd 
10/1/2006 Gijima AST Group AST Distribution Technology (Pty)Ltd 
12/4/2006 Datatec Ltd CSF Solutions Ltd 
2/7/2007 Afrimat Ltd Malans Quarries (Pty)Ltd 
2/20/2007 Group Five Ltd Quarry Cats 
2/23/2007 Telkom SA Ltd Africa Online Inc 
3/27/2007 Emira Property Fund Ltd Freestone Property Holdings Ltd 
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4/19/2007 SA Corporate Real Estate 
Fund 
S A Retail Properties Ltd 
4/26/2007 Aquarius Platinum Ltd Aquarius Platinum (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd 
4/26/2007 Aquarius Platinum Ltd Aquarius Platinum (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd 
5/3/2007 Datatec Ltd Crane Telecommunications Group Ltd 
5/14/2007 Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd African Platinum PLC 
6/26/2007 AngloGold Ashanti Ltd OOO GRK Amikan 
7/16/2007 York Timber Organisation Ltd Global Forest Products (Pty)Ltd 
11/21/2007 Purple Capital Ltd Global Trader Ltd 
12/31/2007 Aspen Pharmacare Holdings 
Ltd 
Onco Therapies Ltd 
1/29/2008 Hudaco Industries Ltd Astore Africa (Pty)Ltd 
1/30/2008 Vox Telecom Ltd Storm Telecom 
7/18/2008 Standard Bank Group Ltd Liberty Holdings Ltd 
9/22/2008 Afrocentric Investment Corp 
Ltd 
Lethimvula Investments Ltd 
9/30/2008 Remgro Ltd PG Group 
10/1/2008 Exxaro Resources Ltd Namakwa Sands (Pty)Ltd 
12/31/2008 Sappi Ltd M-real Corp-Coated Graphic Paper 
Business 
1/29/2009 Absa Group Ltd Pinnacle Point Holdings (Pty) Ltd 
1/29/2009 Absa Group Ltd Blue Financial Services Ltd 
3/2/2009 Distell Group Ltd Pernod Ricard SA-Bisquit Cognac Brand 
3/17/2009 Simmer & Jack Mines Ltd AngloGold Ashanti Ltd-Tau Lekoa Mine 
3/24/2009 African Rainbow Minerals Ltd TEAL Exploration & Mining Inc 
8/5/2009 Growthpoint Properties Ltd Orchard Industrial Property Fund 
9/28/2009 Naspers LTD BuscaPe.com Inc 
9/29/2009 The Bidvest Group Ltd NOWACO Czech Republic sro 
10/1/2009 Allied Technologies Ltd Kenya Data Networks Ltd 
3/1/2010 Santova Logistics Ltd Aviocean(Pty)Ltd 
3/30/2010 Sycom Property Fund Tyger Hills Office Park (Pty) Ltd 
4/14/2010 Adcock Ingram Holdings Ltd Ayrton Drug Manufacturing Ltd 
4/16/2010 Nedbank Group Ltd Imperial Bank Ltd 
4/19/2010 SA Corporate Real Estate 
Fund 
Old Mutual Triangle Warehouse 
7/1/2010 Grand Parade Investments Ltd Tatts Group Ltd-Gaming Operations 
8/27/2010 Redefine Properties Ltd Hyprop Investments Ltd 
9/1/2010 Santam Ltd Indwe Broker Holdings Group Ltd 
9/8/2010 Business Connexion Group 
Ltd 
Business Connexion (Pty)Ltd 
10/7/2010 Datatec Ltd Westcon Group Inc 
11/30/2010 Imperial Holdings Ltd CIC Holdings Ltd 
1/3/2011 FirstRand Ltd Barnard Jacobs Mellet Holdings Ltd 
1/31/2011 Aspen Pharmacare Holdings 
Ltd 
Sigma Pharmaceuticals Ltd- Pharmaceutical 
Division 
3/1/2011 Sasol Ltd Talisman Energy Inc-Farrell Creek Shale 
Gas Assets 
3/18/2011 Steinhoff International 
Holdings Ltd 
Conforama SA 
77 
 
3/28/2011 Capital Property Fund Ltd Pangbourne Properties Ltd 
5/13/2011 Hospitality Property Fund Ltd Arabella South Africa Holdings (Pty)Ltd-
Hotels(2) 
5/31/2011 Tiger Brands Ltd Davita Trading (Pty)Ltd 
6/9/2011 Resilient Property Income 
Fund Ltd 
The Grove, Pretoria 
6/22/2011 Gold Fields Ltd Gold Fields Ltd-Tarkwa & Damang Gold 
Mines 
9/1/2011 Hyprop Investments Ltd Attfund Retail Ltd 
9/30/2011 AngloGold Ashanti Ltd First Uranium Corp 
1/6/2012 Keaton Energy Holdings Ltd Leeuw Mining & Exploration (Pty) Ltd 
3/1/2012 AVI Ltd Green Cross Manufacturers (Pty)Ltd 
3/12/2012 Rainbow Chicken Ltd Bush Valley Chickens 
3/14/2012 Sun International Ltd Real Africa Holdings Ltd 
3/15/2012 Afrimat Ltd Clinker Supplies (Pty)Ltd 
6/13/2012 Hudaco Industries Ltd Keys Makin Plastics (Pty)Ltd, Quality 
Compounding(Pty)Ltd 
6/27/2012 AECI Ltd General Electric Co-Chemical & Monitoring 
Solutiions Business 
7/25/2012 Pretoria Portland Cement Co 
Ltd 
Habesha Cement Share Co 
8/8/2012 PBT Group Ltd Prescient Capital (Pty)Ltd 
10/1/2012 Mondi Ltd Nordenia International AG 
10/2/2012 Sanlam Ltd Shriram Capital Ltd 
12/4/2012 Consolidated Infrastructure 
Group Ltd 
AES Angola Environmental Servicos Lda 
1/24/2013 Netcare Ltd General Healthcare Group PLC 
1/25/2013 Adcorp Holdings Ltd Paxus Australia Pty Ltd 
4/12/2013 Distell Group Ltd Burn Stewart Distillers Ltd 
4/26/2013 Raubex Group Ltd Tosas Holdings (Pty)Ltd 
6/30/2013 ARB Holdings Ltd Eurolux (Pty) Ltd 
7/1/2013 Delta Property Fund Ltd Atterbury Parkdev Consortium (Pty)Ltd 
7/2/2013 The Bidvest Group Ltd Amalgamated Appliance Holdings Ltd 
{AMAP} 
12/11/2013 Murray & Roberts Holdings Ltd Clough Ltd 
2/28/2014 Naspers LTD Neralona Investments Ltd 
3/1/2014 Growthpoint Properties Ltd Tiber Property Group (Pty)Ltd 
4/30/2014 Vodacom Group Ltd Vodacom Tanzania Ltd 
5/1/2014 Tsogo Sun Holdings Ltd Redefine BDL Hotel Group Ltd 
5/21/2014 Steinhoff International 
Holdings Ltd 
JD Group Ltd 
6/12/2014 Nedbank Group Ltd Banco Unico SA 
8/1/2014 Woolworths Holdings Ltd David Jones Ltd 
8/5/2014 Liberty Holdings Ltd Liberty Health Holdings Pty Ltd 
8/31/2014 Redefine Properties Ltd Annuity Properties Ltd 
9/1/2014 Octodec Investments Ltd Premium Properties Ltd 
9/1/2014 Resilient Property Income 
Fund Ltd 
Jubilee Mall 
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9/30/2014 Afrocentric Investment Corp 
Ltd 
Pharmacy Direct (Pty) Ltd,Curasana (Pty) 
Ltd 
11/5/2014 Vukile Property Fund Ltd Synergy Income Fund Ltd 
11/10/2014 Discovery Ltd Prudential Health Ltd 
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